HATE USA HATE EUROPE Official Curriculum For Pakistani Military Officers

A leaked U.S. diplomatic cable says that senior Pakistani military officers are taught anti-American courses at a prestigious defense university in the heart of the capital. This is a cable sent by Ambassador Ann Patterson.

So what is new, most of the people in the region know about this very open secret. Only problem is that US has its eyes wide shut. It refuses to see what is staring it right in the face. PAKISTAN IS ACTIVELY SPREADING GLOBAL JIHAD. And in this mission the active participant are the Pakistani Military and ISI.

The following cable clearly shows the Islamic Radicals control the Pakistani military. Therefore expecting them to actually help USA to fight terrorism or protect their nukes from Jihadi's is a naive at best stupid at worst.

Original Cable

153436 5/12/2008 12:36 08ISLAMABAD1825 Embassy Islamabad CONFIDENTIAL 08ISLAMABAD1073 “VZCZCXRO1760 OO RUEHLH RUEHPW DE RUEHIL #1825/01 1331236 ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 121236Z MAY 08


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SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PK, PREL


SUBJECT: LIFE AT NDU: TRAINING PAKISTAN’S NEXT GENERATION OF MILITARY LEADERS


REF: ISLAMABAD 1073


Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)


1. (C) Summary: Pakistan’s National Defense University’s Curriculum is designed to foster national pride, but many of its students and instructors have an anti-American bias.


Their attitudes demonstrate why we should continue our efforts to increase IMET opportunities, especially those aimed at the generation of Pakistani military who were ineligible for IMET during the sanctions years. We should also consider an exchange program of instructors to broaden understanding of the U.S. End summary.


2. (C) On April 29, Poloff met with U.S. Army Colonel Michael Schleicher, who currently is attending the Senior Course at National Defense University (NDU). The following cable details his perceptions of the course, his classmates, and his instructors.


NDU Overview
————————————


3. (C) Pakistan’s National Defense University (formerly National Defense College) currently is lead by Lieutenant General Hamid Khan, the former 11th Corps Commander. NDU has two courses: students at the colonel and brigadier rank attend the Senior Course and obtain the equivalent of a master’s degree; the Junior Course is for students at the lieutenant colonel and colonel rank.


Course Curriculum
—————–—————–—————–


4. (C) Instruction for the Senior Course centers around three pillars that emphasize national pride. Students are first instructed on classic nation state development, which includes use of Islamic texts. The second pillar uses Pakistan’s foundation documents–such as the works of Mohammad Ali Jinnah (the George Washington of Pakistan) and the country’s first constitution–to discuss why Pakistan was created and how this legacy should impact the country’s future policies. Economic courses–the third pillar–make up approximately half of course lectures, with particular focus on macroeconomics and regional water and energy issues.


5. (C) The Directing Staff–along with guest speakers–provide lectures that are read from scripts usually meticulously vetted in advance. Lecturers often “”teach”" their students information that is heavily biased against the United States. Throughout this year’s course, only a handful of non-Pakistanis were invited to speak as guest lecturers.


Student Demographics
——————–——————–——————–


6. (C) The Senior Course this year includes 135 classmates, approximately 25 of whom are military officers from Pakistan’s allies (including the U.S., Britain, Canada, China, Islamic Countries, South Africa, Nigeria, and Libya).Pakistani senior civil servants are also allowed in the class.


7. (C) Most of the Pakistani students in this year’s class are approximately 50 years old; almost all had parents who were born in British-India. During his professional and personal interactions with the students, Col. Schleicher estimated that approximately a third of his class was religiously devout, a third of his class was moderately religious, and less than a third of his class was overtly secular. Of the 135 Senior Course students, only two openly drank alcohol. Col. Schleicher believed the secular students felt peer pressure to appear more religious than they actually were.


8. (C) The Pakistani military students appeared to come from wealthy families or from military families and were proud they received amenities, including private-quality schools and good health care, as an incentive to stay in the military. Officers at the brigadier rank touted their privileges, including a house, car, and a driver. The NDU students also obtained financial perks, such as a free trip for a pilgrimage that could be taken


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at the end of the class’ official travels.


9. (C) There is one woman in this year’s Senior Course; last year there were two women in the class. During all trips and visits, the separation of men and women is strictly observed. For example, there are separate buses for the female student and the officers, wives. The Directing Staff includes a woman member, Ambassador Raanan, who previously represented Pakistan in Turkmenistan.


10. (C) Although the class is conducted in English, few students are truly fluent. Some of the foreign students are functionally illiterate in English.


Misperceptions
———————————————


11. (C) Course instructors often had misperceptions about U.S. policies and culture and infused their lectures with these suspicions. For example, one guest lecturer–who is a Pakistani one-star general–claimed the U.S. National Security Agency actively trains correspondents for media organizations. Some students share these misconceptions despite having children who attended universities in the U.S. or London. For example, some did not believe the U.S. used female pilots overseas; they were convinced female pilots were restricted to flying within U.S. borders. Others thought the CIA was in charge of U.S. media (and that MI-5 was in charge of the BBC). Students in the Junior Course shared many of the biases prevalent in the Muslim world, including a belief the U.S. invaded Iraq for its oil and that 9/11 was a staged “”Jewish conspiracy.”" In contrast to criticism of the U.S., students and instructors were adamant in their approval of all things Chinese.


12. (C) Comment: When Ambassador addressed NDU last year, she received astonishingly naive and biased questions about America. With Washington’s support, post is working to dramatically increase IMET opportunities for officers and NCOs. We need, in particular, to target the “”lost generation”" of Pakistan military who missed IMET opportunities during the sanctions years. The elite of this crop of colonels and brigadiers are receiving biased NDU training with no chance to hear alternative views of the U.S. Given the bias of the instructors, we also believe it would be beneficial to initiate an exchange program for instructors.


PATTERSON

Pakistani Airforce Sabotaging Its Own F-16s

A WikiLeaks cable, says Pakistan's airmen were being radicalised and were sabotaging Pakistani F-16s deployed for security operations along the Afghan border.

The cable, sent in March 2006 from the US embassy to Washington, quotes Pakistan's then Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, Air Vice Marshal (AVM) Khalid Chaudhry, as saying that the airmen, most of whom came from rural villages, were being radicalised by extremist Islamic clerics. The cable quotes AVM Chaudhry as saying, "You can't imagine what a hard time we have trying to get to trim their beards." The cable notes that, "This last comment refers to the tradition of conservative Muslims to grow full beards as a sign of piety."

The cable also says that Chaudhry claimed "to receive reports monthly of acts of petty sabotage, which he interpreted as an effort by Islamists amongst the enlisted ranks to prevent PAF aircraft from being deployed in support of security operations in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border."

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SIPDIS


KABUL - PLEASE PASS TO CFC-A


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015
TAGS: PK, PTER, MOPS, MASS, MCAP, PREL
SUBJECT: A/S HILLEN VISIT TO PAKISTAN


Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Introduction: On his March 15-18 visit to Pakistan,A/S John Hillen and PM/RSAT Tom Canahuate met with senior Government of Pakistan (GOP) officials, as well as Pakistan's top military leadership. Describing his role in soliciting support for USG security assistance to Pakistan from the U.S. Congress, A/S Hillen urged Pakistan's defense leaders to come to a decision soonest on the desired configuration for its purchase of F-16s. A/S Hillen described the process by which the Administration notifies Congress of the transfer of defense assets, and counseled the Pakistanis on steps they could take to facilitate Congressional approval of the F-16 transfer. Turning to the Global War on Terror (GWOT), A/S Hillen praised Pakistan's commitment to routing anti-Coalition militants and other extremists in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border, and sought Pakistani perspectives on how the U.S. could best configure its security assistance to support Pakistan's security operations in the region. Many Pakistani interlocutors raised questions regarding the expanding bilateral relationship between the U.S. and India,noting that it has led to much public speculation as to the value that Washington ascribes to the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship. A/S Hillen stated flatly that President Bush does not view our bilateral relations with India and with Pakistan as a zero sum game; he stressed that the Administration seeks a sustained, strategic relationship with Pakistan. End introduction.


National Defense College (NDC)
------------------------------


2. (SBU) At NDC Commandant LTG Raza Muhammed Khan and his staff briefed A/S Hillen on the institution's history, mission and organization. In a broad discussion of security issues, LTG Raza raised a number of "irritants" in the Pakistani-Afghanistan relationship, citing difficulties in achieving effective security cooperation along the common border and Pakistan's vulnerability vis-a-vis India's "foreign hand," which he alleged is operating out of Afghanistan to destabilize Balochistan. Raza voiced his concern at the expanding U.S.-Indian relationship, saying that new Delhi received "far more than it deserved" during President Bush's recent visit. A/S Hillen assured LTG Raza that although India is an important global power with whom the U.S. has a broad and complex relationship, this does not detract from the sustained and enduring partnership that the U.S. and Pakistan have built over decades. A/S Hillen and LTG Raza agreed that NDC will play a vital role as the U.S. and Pakistan strive for a partnership of strategic vision, not simply military hardware.


Ministry of Defense (MoD)
-------------------------


3. (C) At the MoD, A/S Hillen was received by Minister of State Zahid Hamid and Additional Secretary RDML (ret.) A.H. Chaudhary. Hamid thanked the U.S. for its assistance following the October 8 South Asian earthquake. A/S Hillen turned the conversation to the value of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which he would like to expand for Pakistan. When Hillen asked for an assessment of Government of Pakistan's (GOP) current thinking on F-16 aircraft purchase, Minister Hamid said that the GOP is definitely interested in purchasing new aircraft, as well as refurbishing its current fleet and perhaps acquiring airframes through third-country buy-backs. (Note: Hamid was not specific as to the number of new aircraft the GOP would seek. End note.) Hillen encouraged the MoD to forward its desired mix of F-16s to the USG as soon as possible, so that the administration can move forward with Congressional Notification on the transfer. Minister Hamid was pleased to


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hear A/S Hillen say that he is trying to increase USG financial support for Pakistani forces currently engaged in security operations in the Tribal Areas along the Afghan border. Recognizing Pakistan's leading role in  international peace-keeping operations, Hillen also encouraged the MoD to consider offering training to African militaries interested in enhancing their conflict prevention and stabilization capacities.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
---------------------------------


4. (C) At the MFA, Chief of Protocol (and former Director General - Disarmament) Nazir Hussain briefed  A/S Hillen on Pakistan's programs to enhance its non-proliferation regime. The Protocol Chief expressed gratitude to the U.S. for earthquake relief assistance, but also shared deep dismay that President Bush had resurrected the A.Q. Khan legacy by citing Pakistan's non-proliferation record as the reason the U.S. would not consider offering Islamabad a civil nuclear deal to parallel that with India. "Your man cut Musharraf off at the knees" with that public comment, Hussain said, noting that his President has a tough time selling his close relationship with the U.S. to a deeply skeptical Pakistani public. (Note: Nazir Hussain's briefing on a special PM program will be reported septel. End note). Additional Secretary (Americas) Shahid Kamal told A/S Hillen that SIPDIS Pakistan is looking forward to moving forward after the successful visit by President Bush earlier in March. The public now has high expectations for the bilateral relationship, which presents a challenge to both sides. When Hillen asked for one area in which Pakistan could use U.S.  assistance, Kamal quickly took the opportunity to name two: education and market access for textiles. Additional Secretary for International Organizations Tariq Usman Haider SIPDIS asked to see A/S Hillen to discuss the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), asking whether the U.S. would be willing to discuss possible Pakistani PSI participation; A/S Hillen agreed to take the question back to his T-Bureau colleagues
in Washington.


Pakistan Air Force Head Quarters
 --------------------------------


5. (C) At PAF HQ March 17, Air Vice Marshall (AVM) Khalid Chaudhry (Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations) and Air Commodore Jamshed listened carefully as A/S Hillen outlined concerns raised by some Members of Congress regarding the pending sale of F-16s to Pakistan. AVM Chaudhry assured A/S
Hillen that Pakistan is prepared to address all USG security concerns regarding the F-16s. Citing PAF's long history of cooperation with USAF, he was perplexed that some in the U.S. are still anxious about Pakistan's security protocols for the F-16s. Chaudhry acknowledged that the Chinese JF-17 (another staple in the PAF fleet) is simply not comparable to the F-16 in terms of quality, particularly its avionics and weapons systems. Chaudhry then contrasted PAF's F-16 fleet to the array of fighters possessed by the Indian Air Force (IAF),supported by strong defense acquisition relationships with the U.S. and Israel. "The math just doesn't add up," Chaudhry said, admitting that the PAF has no hope of matching the IAF's resources. Even the proposed F-16 purchase will not make that much difference in the relative imbalance of power, although it will enable  Pakistan to maintain a minimum deterrent capability. The F-16s have acquired a mythic quality in Pakistan, AVM Chaudhry admitted, taking on an inflated symbolic importance in the public imagination. He concluded by asking A/S Hillen to ensure that the F-16 deal has enough sweeteners to appeal to the public -- a complete squadron of new F-16s, with JDAM and night-vision capability -- but not to offer the PAF things that it cannot afford.


6. (C) Warming to his subject, Chaudhry told the delegation


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that Pakistan would certainly establish adequate security protocols for the F-16s, but that at the end of the day, the U.S. simply needs to trust its partner. He cautioned that the U.S. should not "mock" Pakistan by offering "bone-yard" F-16s as part of the sale, saying that offering to transfer mothballed aircraft only plays into the hand of President Musharraf's extremist enemies, who already find a ready audience amongst Pakistan's uneducated masses. In contrast, Chaudhry said, the Chinese "understand the Pakistani psyche" and therefore "they offer us everything," always on advantageous financial terms.


7. (S) Given all that Pakistan has done for the U.S., Chaudhry said, Pakistan's military leaders have a difficult time maintaining positive attitudes toward the U.S. amongst enlisted personnel. He cited the suseptibility of the
enlisted ranks -- most of whom come from rural villages -- to the influence of extremist Islamic clerics: "You can't imagine what a hard time we have trying to get to trim their beards." (Note: This last comment refers to the tradition of conservative Muslims to grow full beards as a sign of piety. End note.) Chaudhry claimed to receive reports monthly of acts of petty sabotage, which he interpreted as an effort by Islamists amongst the enlisted ranks to prevent PAF aircraft from being deployed in support of security operations in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Afghan border. (Note: Speaking off the record, Chaudhry told A/S Hillen that PAF aircraft are regularly called to provide air support to military and security forces when they get into tight spots in the FATA...dryily adding that Army brass and the ground forces commanders would deny it. End note.)


Vice Chief of Army Staff (VCOAS)
--------------------------------


8. (C) VCOAS GEN Ahdan Saleem Hyat greeted A/S Hillen with thanks for American generosity and steadfast support following the October 8 earthquake, fondly describing how U.S. Chinook helicopters became a symbol of the relief effort. He offered his condolences on the deaths of two Embassy Karachi employees in a March 2 suicide bombing, before turning to Pak-Afghan relations. Praising the Tripartite Commission, GEN Ahsan opined that increased mil-mil interaction and cooperation -- including exchanges and intelligence-sharing -- would squelch the unhelpful public bickering widely reported in the media in recent
weeks. GEN Ahsan renewed a proposal first presented to GEN Abizaid and LTG Eikenberry on March 6 to incorporate Afghan National Army (ANA) troops into a joint Pak-U.S. counter-terrorism (CT) exercise scheduled for May 2006. GEN Ahsan said that Pakistan must succeed in its current CT operations in the FATA along the Aghan border for its own sake. Grateful for U.S. assistance thus far, GEN Ahsan said that future assistance must be more sharply focused, particularly citing Pakistan's need for top-of-the-line air assault assets equipped with night-vision capability. Ahsan gave special emphasis to the need to minimize collateral damage in the FATA, in order not to alienate the local population whose cooperation was critical to identifying and dislodging militant forces seeking refuge in the area. A/S Hillen responded that the U.S. fully understood the benefits of night operations in support of a counter-insurgency campaign. He also praised GEN Ahsan's description of the GOP's integrated strategy to extend government control to the FATA, securing military gains with development assistance and political engagement.


Field Trip to Shahbaz and Mushaf Air Bases
------------------------------------------


9. (C) On March 16, A/S Hillen led a U.S. delegation to the Shahbaz Air Base near Jacobabad, Sindh Province, for


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briefings on the Falcon Talon F-16 joint USAF-PAF exercise. After an initial greeting and briefing by Base Commander Air Commodore Athar Bukhari, A/S Hillen and delegation toured the airbase and visited with USAF F-16 ground crew and support staff. The Falcon Talon exercise is the first unified USAF/PAF exercise on Pakistani soil. The exercises covered daytime air combat intercepts and unified strike missions.
Non-flying exercise objectives covered EOD, flight safety and quality assurance. On March 17, A/S Hillen and delegation traveled to Mushaf Air Base in Sargodha, which has been the home of Pakistan's F-16 fleet since 1983. The delegation received a thorough briefing of security and maintenance procedures at the base before touring key facilities.


10. (U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Hillen.
CROCKER

US Pressure On India To Engage Pakistan

By Anwar Iqbal

Diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show that the United States has been continuously urging India to engage Pakistan in bilateral talks, but New Delhi refuses to do so until Islamabad meets its demands first.

A cable sent to Washington by the US Embassy in New Delhi on June 29, 2009, quoted former National Security Adviser James Jones querying the then India army cChief Gen. Deepak Kapoor on prospects of upgrading Indo-Pakistan military talks to discuss bilateral issues.

“Gen Kapoor rhetorically asked whether there should not be a degree of confidence in Pakistan before such a dialogue can even begin,” the cable noted.

Indian Defence Minister A.K. Antony, who also attended the meeting where Mr Jones raised this issue, interjected that “unless there is some tangible follow-up action by Pakistan against the perpetrators of the 11/26 attacks (in Mumbai), discussions with Pakistan will be difficult.”

Regarding the Indian complaint that Pakistan still had terrorist camps on its territory, Mr Jones told Mr Antony and Gen Kapoor that the US would take up the issue with Pakistan.

But the US national security adviser reminded the Indians that “regional problems require regional solutions” and underscored “the need for all of us to move forward on a broader strategy by building confidence and trust”. Mr Antony told Mr Jones that India had a stake in Afghanistan, reminding him that India’s borders before partition extended up to Afghanistan.

“The Indian military is concerned by the situation in Afghanistan,” Mr Antony admitted, and stressed that the international community’s operations there must succeed because “India cannot imagine for a moment a Taliban takeover of its ‘extended neighbour’.

Earlier, when the conversation moved to Pakistan, Gen Kapoor told Mr Jones the Pakistan Army’s statements regarding the Indian threat on its eastern border were wholly without merit. Even after the 11/26 strikes on Mumbai, he emphasised, India did not make any move of a threatening nature toward Pakistan.

Gen. Kapoor alleged that there were 43 terrorist camps in Pakistan, 22 of which were located in Azad Kashmir. Although the Pakistanis raided some camps in the wake of 11/26, Gen Kapoor averred, some camps had reinitiated operations.

Gen. Kapoor further asserted that infiltration across the Line of Control could not occur “unless there is some kind of assistance and/or degree of support that is institutional in nature”.

He claimed that several incidents of infiltration had occurred in 2009, including that of 40 terrorists in March who were found possessing significant ammunition and other equipment. “India is worried, Gen. Kapoor said, that some part of the huge US military package to Pakistan will find its way to the hands of terrorists targeting India.”

Furthermore, if “we can catch them (the infiltrators), why can’t the Pakistani military?” Gen. Kapoor asked.

“There’s a trust deficit between the US and Pakistan, but there’s also one between India and Pakistan,” he stressed. Mr Jones asked Gen Kapoor how the Pakistanis react when the Indians confront them with these incidents. Gen. Kapoor replied the Pakistanis remain in denial mode, but “fortunately today India’s counter-infiltration posture is stronger than in the past.”

Asked about the percentage of infiltrators that get through, Gen. Kapoor estimated between 15 to 20 per cent, but cited the challenge posed by Indias open border with Nepal.

He asserted that at least 16 terrorists entered India through Nepal in 2009 and then travelled to Kashmir. “Throughout his remarks, Gen. Kapoor stressed that infiltration bids were ‘acts of aggression’,” the US diplomatic cable observed.

“The US-India partnership is very important in this context. The worst thing for the region would be another 11/26-type attack,” Jones stressed, and that “we cannot let the terrorists play us off against each other.”

Another US diplomatic cable sent shortly after the 2008 Mumbai attack says the British High Commission in Islamabad feared an Indian response might include,” at a minimum, increase GOI (government of India) covert activities in Balochistan or even an aerial bombardment of LeT (Lashkar-i-Taiba) camps in Azad Kashmir.

The Guardian newspaper, which was given advance access to the cable, adds that “the British fears of ‘ramped-up’ Indian aid to militant nationalists in Balochistan highlights an assertion found elsewhere in the cables: that British intelligence strongly believes New Delhi is covertly supporting the insurgency in reaction to alleged Pakistani support for LeT.”

A Jan 2007 cable about Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s meeting with US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and Overseas Private Investment Corporation President and Chief Executive Officer Robert Mosbacher also addresses the issue of Afghanistan being used to stir troubles in Balochistan.

The cables noted that in an earlier meeting with then prime minister Shaukat Aziz, President Karzai had said that “the Bugtis were not terrorists and represented nobility in Afghanistan, so it would be hard to turn them over to Pakistan”.

Mr Boucher clarified that it was the grandson that the Pakistanis were after for instigating an uprising. Mr Karzai responded that “fomenting uprising does not make one a terrorist. The real terrorists were (Osama) bin Laden and Mullah Omar.

Afghanistan needs a sign that Pakistan will stop supporting these terrorists.”

Mr Boucher asked Mr Karzai which side should move first and queried whether Afghanistan could take the grandson into custody or strike some political deal. Mr Karzai explained that the Bugtis would blame the United States if Afghanistan turned them in. There would be disgust toward both Afghanistan and the United States.

Mr Boucher asked Mr Karzai if he could assure Pakistan that the Bugtis were not supporting armed struggle and that India was not involved. Karzai said “yes”, though he doubted Pakistan would accept his assurances. “Pakistan would continue to think India is involved. There is a lot of misinformation out there,” Mr Karzai commented. He said he knew Nawab Akbar Bugti, who was highly respected in the US. Mr Karzai explained that Bugti had once tried to call him, but he had refused for the sake of good relations with Pakistan.

“Now he cannot forgive himself for refusing.” Mr Karzai assessed that Pakistan had troubles with many other tribes too, as a result of its trying to divide and conquer and turn the tribes against each other.” Pakistan needed to address the bigger picture, Mr Karzai urged. The cable notes that halfway through the discussion about Bugtis, President Karzai “signalled that the issue was too sensitive and asked that note taking be suspended”