Hillary Clinton To Visit Turkey,Greece And India Between July 15-July 19

courtesy Telegraph.co.uk

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accompanied by a delegation of senior U.S. officials will pay visits to Turkey, Greece and India July 15-19, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said on Friday.

On July 15-16 Clinton will be in Turkey to discuss bilateral ties as well as the conflicts in Libya and Syria with President Abdullah Gul, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and other top officials. She will also take part in a Libya contact group meeting, Nuland said.

The U.S. politician will arrive in Greece on July 17 and remain for a day there. She will meet with President Karolos Papoulias and Prime Minister Georgis Papandreou.

Clinton will finally head for India on June 19. In New Delhi she will take part in the second round of the U.S.-India strategic dialogue.
(source Rio Novosti)

Indians are bastards anyway:Henry Kissinger

Ex-US President Richard Nixon called Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi an "old witch", according to documents from the 1970s.

President Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger saw India as a "Soviet stooge" during the South Asia crisis of 1971, downplayed reports of Pakistani genocide in what is now Bangladesh, and even suggested that China intervene militarily on Pakistan's side, according to startling new documentation from White House files and tapes contained in the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series and reposted by the National Security Archive.

Earlier this week, the Office of the Historian at the State Department hosted a major conference on U.S. policy in South Asia focusing on the 1971 India-Pakistan war triggered by the crisis over Bangladesh. (Note 1) Much of the discussion focused on, and flowed from, a new volume of documentation edited by Louis J. Smith for the FRUS series. (Note 2) Besides including the usual cables and memoranda, the editors of this volume made significant use of the White House tapes and the transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations. "This volume deserves the attention of the widest possible readership because of its fascinating, sometimes startling, revelations on Nixon administration policy. It gives the reader an unparalleled perspective on the inner workings of White House policy throughout the crisis," said Dr. William Burr, senior analyst at the National Security Archive, who attended the conference.

Triggered by East Pakistan's (now Bangladesh) quest for independence, the 1971 crisis quickly raised human rights issues because of what White House officials characterized as a "reign of terror" (Note 3) orchestrated by Pakistani forces. While consular officials in Dacca, East Pakistan privately criticized the U.S. government's "failure to denounce atrocities," (Note 4) Nixon and Kissinger did not want "to get [the] West Pakistanis turned against us," in part because President Yahya was providing a secret communication link for their quest for rapprochement with China. (Note 5) The close China-Pakistan relationship was central to Nixon's wish to "tilt" U.S. policy toward Pakistan in part to show Beijing that Washington would support its allies. (Note 6)

With Pakistani refugees fleeing into India, the crisis quickly turned into a clash between India and Pakistan. Quickly defining and dramatizing a regional national/ethnic crisis in geo-political terms, Nixon and Kissinger saw India as a Soviet client state that was determined to weaken Pakistan fatally. China, however, had a close relationship with Pakistan and Nixon wanted to "tilt" U.S. policy toward Pakistan to show Beijing that Washington would support its allies.

As the crisis turned to war, Nixon and Kissinger saw the event as a Cold War confrontation which could involve a China-Soviet conflict and U.S. confrontation with the Soviet Union. "The documents show that Nixon and Kissinger overlooked the regional, ethnic, and national dimensions of the crisis and instead saw it in terms of the Cold War and macho terms, which made the crisis even more dangerous; they risked a China-Soviet conflict so they could demonstrate what they thought was toughness and resolve," commented Dr. Burr. (Note 7)

Some of the most fascinating documents in the volume concern Nixon and Kissinger's reactions to developments just before and during the war and their discussions of policy options. Among the highlights:

Their reactions to Nixon's meetings with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on November 5, 1971. According to Kissinger, the "Indians are bastards anyway. They are starting a war there … [W]hile [Gandhi] was a bitch, we got what we wanted to … She will not be able to go home and say that the United States didn't give her a warm reception and therefore in despair she's got to go to war." (Note 8)

Their agreement that China could put pressure on India: " I think we've got to tell [the Chinese] that some movement on their part … toward the Indian border could be very significant." On December 8, Nixon and Kissinger agreed to transfer planes to Pakistan and to tell the Chinese that "if you are ever going to move this is the time." Kissinger noted the danger that may arise "if our bluff is called." (Note 9)

The controversial CIA report that led Kissinger and Nixon to believe that India intended to dismember Pakistan and destroy its armed forces. (Note 10)

Later on December 8, Nixon and Kissinger decide to send an aircraft carrier and other naval forces into the Bay of Bengal in order to prevent a "Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms" from overrunning Pakistan. (Note 11)

Interpreting the regional crisis in geo-strategic terms, Kissinger justifies intervention to "prevent the West Pakistani army from being destroyed. And secondly to retain our Chinese arm. And thirdly, to prevent a complete collapse of the world's psychological balance of power, which will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed client state can tackle [Pakistan] without anybody doing anything." While U.S. action could jeopardize the developing détente with Moscow, Kissinger suggested to Nixon that "your card [is] your willingness to jeopardize it." (Note 12)

Nixon's hot line message to Brezhnev on 10 December urging the Soviets " in the strongest possible terms to restrain India with which … you have great influence and for whose actions you must share responsibility." (Note 13)

On December 10, Kissinger delicately encourages the Chinese to take action against India guaranteeing U.S. support if the Soviets retaliate: "if the People's Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose efforts of others to interfere with the People's Republic." (Note 14)

On December 12, Kissinger tells Nixon that by taking a tough stand with the Soviets he was making a "typical Nixon plan. I mean it's bold… But my view is that if we do nothing there's a certainty of disaster. This way there is a high possibility of one, but at least we're coming off like men." With Beijing's UN ambassador calling for an urgent meeting in New York with White House officials, Kissinger was sure that Beijing was "going to move. No question, they're going to move." If the Chinese intervene, Nixon asked "what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons." Kissinger later answered that "We don't have to lob nuclear weapons. We have to go on alert… We may have to put forces in. We may have to give them bombing assistance." This will provide an "opportunity to clean up Vietnam at that point" by giving an ultimatum to Hanoi and blockading Haiphong harbor. (Note 15)

Nixon was not as sure as Kissinger that Beijing and Moscow would go to war and when General Alexander Haig met with the Chinese later that day, Nixon and Kissinger learned that the Chinese had not made any military decisions but would call for a cease-fire and mutual troop withdrawal and support a stand-still cease-fire if necessary.

Even before they realized that Beijing was not going to intervene, the Soviets had assured the White House that the Indians were not going to attack West Pakistan and that they were working with Prime Minister Gandhi on a cease-fire. Ever the courtier, Kissinger praised Nixon for his willingness to confront the Soviets: "What you did this morning Mr. President was a heroic thing." On December 16, Pakistani forces surrendered in East Pakistan and a cease-fire took effect the next day. (Note 16)

Source National Security Archives George Washington University

After MMRCA, Indo-US Defense Ties

Article written by Karl F. Inderfurth and S. Amer Latif


Moving forward after the recent decision on which combat aircraft to acquire, Washington and New Delhi need to develop a pragmatic approach to defence and security relations.

The Indian government's decision to choose two non-U.S. finalists for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition was, as one U.S. official put it, “a source of puzzlement and disappointment” for the government and defence industry. After putting forward two of the most formidable fighters ever deployed — and investing millions of dollars in the competition — neither Boeing nor Lockheed Martin was able to secure a place among the finalists in the selection process. Had they been chosen, the U.S. aircraft would have also provided a ladder to ever higher levels of U.S. technology transfer.

That said, while U.S. government and industry officials are dismayed over the decision, it should not inhibit the continued deepening of defence ties between the U.S. and India. The U.S. and India have made substantial progress over the past half-decade in this regard and it should be noted that fitful transitions to new partnerships are not new for India.

Ronen Sen, India's former Ambassador to the U.S., captured the dynamic well in his April 1 speech to the Institute of Defence and Security Analysis (IDSA) when he outlined the historical phases of India's defence relations with various countries, to include the recent ties with the U.S. Sen observed: “During virtually all these transitional phases there were initial reservations and resistance to changes in significant sections of our political, bureaucratic and, to a lesser extent, military establishments. The debate on the current transitional phase in our defence cooperation is thus not unprecedented.”

Level of uneasiness

However, while the debate goes on within the Indian government, there is a similar discussion going on within U.S. government and industry circles about what the future holds for the U.S.-India relationship. Most Americans fully understand that it will take persistence and patience to build this relationship. They also understand India's desire to protect its strategic autonomy and diversify its arms supply from a variety of sources. However, what is causing a measure of uneasiness within the U.S. is a sense that India may be viewing the relationship as transactional rather than a long term strategic partnership.

After concluding the civilian nuclear agreement, removing the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) from the U.S. Commerce Department's Entity List, and publicly supporting India for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, there has been a sense of disappointment at the rate of progress. While defence deals for cargo and surveillance aircraft are welcome and important, there is an American desire to take the partnership to the next level where both sides can work more seamlessly on areas of common interests such as maritime security in the Indian Ocean, counter-piracy, and humanitarian disasters. Instead, Americans perceive their Indian interlocutors as largely focused on technology transfer, co-production, and building its indigenous defence production capabilities, with much less enthusiasm shown for how both sides might work together on issues of common strategic concern.

Moving forward after the MMRCA decision, both sides need to develop a pragmatic approach to defence and security relations that is rooted in practical cooperation rather than the next giant step, like the civilian nuclear agreement or the multi-billion dollar fighter competition. In the words of Under Secretary of Defence Michelle Flournoy, the U.S. and India need to move towards a relationship that is “normal, expected, and routine.” In this regard, the two countries should focus on initiatives that develop closer cooperation between the military services and foster a better understanding of how each government bureaucracy works.

Past instances of cooperation

While past instances of practical cooperation such as joint humanitarian efforts during the 2004 tsunami were notable, they are episodic and inconsistent. Both sides could start by developing procedures for cooperating on areas of mutual concern. For example, the Indian and U.S. navies, perhaps working through the U.S.-India Navy Executive Steering Group, could develop standard operating procedures for cooperating on humanitarian disasters, incidents of maritime proliferation, or counter-piracy. Developing such procedures is not dependent on signing defence agreements and would provide a practical way for both sides to deepen defence relations. Such practical cooperation would not impinge upon India's freedom of action; to the contrary, it would enhance India's ability to act as a provider of security and stability in the region and beyond.

It is also very important to remove bureaucratic bottlenecks that are impeding closer U.S.-India defence ties. As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake recently said, the two countries need “to increase understanding of each other's processes, practices, and procedures to enable better cooperation in the future.” For U.S. government and industry, South Block can be a mystery with paperwork or actions held up for months without any indication of when decisions might be taken. Indian officials sometimes perceive the U.S. bureaucracy as a source of confusion and frustration with unclear and inconsistent rationale on why particular technologies are granted or denied. While both sides conduct a range of bilateral defence dialogues, there is still a significant lack of understanding of how the bureaucracies in New Delhi and Washington work (or don't work as the case might be!).

Finally, both sides need to refrain from trumpeting any particular defence initiative or defence deal as a litmus test or indicator for the relationship. This does not mean that there should be no ‘big ideas' of taking defence relations to the next level. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that in the case of U.S. and India, close defence relations need to emerge through routine interaction, rather than be punctuated solely by major defence deals or large exercises. Such an approach should be acceptable for India's domestic politics, mollify American demands for more practical cooperation, and keep Asia reassured about deepening defence ties between these two great democracies.

( Karl F. Inderfurth is Senior Advisor and Wadhwani Chair for U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served as the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Affairs from 1997-2001. S. Amer Latif is a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served as the Director for South Asian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2007-2011. The views reflect only those of the authors.)