After MMRCA, Indo-US Defense Ties

Article written by Karl F. Inderfurth and S. Amer Latif


Moving forward after the recent decision on which combat aircraft to acquire, Washington and New Delhi need to develop a pragmatic approach to defence and security relations.

The Indian government's decision to choose two non-U.S. finalists for the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition was, as one U.S. official put it, “a source of puzzlement and disappointment” for the government and defence industry. After putting forward two of the most formidable fighters ever deployed — and investing millions of dollars in the competition — neither Boeing nor Lockheed Martin was able to secure a place among the finalists in the selection process. Had they been chosen, the U.S. aircraft would have also provided a ladder to ever higher levels of U.S. technology transfer.

That said, while U.S. government and industry officials are dismayed over the decision, it should not inhibit the continued deepening of defence ties between the U.S. and India. The U.S. and India have made substantial progress over the past half-decade in this regard and it should be noted that fitful transitions to new partnerships are not new for India.

Ronen Sen, India's former Ambassador to the U.S., captured the dynamic well in his April 1 speech to the Institute of Defence and Security Analysis (IDSA) when he outlined the historical phases of India's defence relations with various countries, to include the recent ties with the U.S. Sen observed: “During virtually all these transitional phases there were initial reservations and resistance to changes in significant sections of our political, bureaucratic and, to a lesser extent, military establishments. The debate on the current transitional phase in our defence cooperation is thus not unprecedented.”

Level of uneasiness

However, while the debate goes on within the Indian government, there is a similar discussion going on within U.S. government and industry circles about what the future holds for the U.S.-India relationship. Most Americans fully understand that it will take persistence and patience to build this relationship. They also understand India's desire to protect its strategic autonomy and diversify its arms supply from a variety of sources. However, what is causing a measure of uneasiness within the U.S. is a sense that India may be viewing the relationship as transactional rather than a long term strategic partnership.

After concluding the civilian nuclear agreement, removing the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) from the U.S. Commerce Department's Entity List, and publicly supporting India for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, there has been a sense of disappointment at the rate of progress. While defence deals for cargo and surveillance aircraft are welcome and important, there is an American desire to take the partnership to the next level where both sides can work more seamlessly on areas of common interests such as maritime security in the Indian Ocean, counter-piracy, and humanitarian disasters. Instead, Americans perceive their Indian interlocutors as largely focused on technology transfer, co-production, and building its indigenous defence production capabilities, with much less enthusiasm shown for how both sides might work together on issues of common strategic concern.

Moving forward after the MMRCA decision, both sides need to develop a pragmatic approach to defence and security relations that is rooted in practical cooperation rather than the next giant step, like the civilian nuclear agreement or the multi-billion dollar fighter competition. In the words of Under Secretary of Defence Michelle Flournoy, the U.S. and India need to move towards a relationship that is “normal, expected, and routine.” In this regard, the two countries should focus on initiatives that develop closer cooperation between the military services and foster a better understanding of how each government bureaucracy works.

Past instances of cooperation

While past instances of practical cooperation such as joint humanitarian efforts during the 2004 tsunami were notable, they are episodic and inconsistent. Both sides could start by developing procedures for cooperating on areas of mutual concern. For example, the Indian and U.S. navies, perhaps working through the U.S.-India Navy Executive Steering Group, could develop standard operating procedures for cooperating on humanitarian disasters, incidents of maritime proliferation, or counter-piracy. Developing such procedures is not dependent on signing defence agreements and would provide a practical way for both sides to deepen defence relations. Such practical cooperation would not impinge upon India's freedom of action; to the contrary, it would enhance India's ability to act as a provider of security and stability in the region and beyond.

It is also very important to remove bureaucratic bottlenecks that are impeding closer U.S.-India defence ties. As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake recently said, the two countries need “to increase understanding of each other's processes, practices, and procedures to enable better cooperation in the future.” For U.S. government and industry, South Block can be a mystery with paperwork or actions held up for months without any indication of when decisions might be taken. Indian officials sometimes perceive the U.S. bureaucracy as a source of confusion and frustration with unclear and inconsistent rationale on why particular technologies are granted or denied. While both sides conduct a range of bilateral defence dialogues, there is still a significant lack of understanding of how the bureaucracies in New Delhi and Washington work (or don't work as the case might be!).

Finally, both sides need to refrain from trumpeting any particular defence initiative or defence deal as a litmus test or indicator for the relationship. This does not mean that there should be no ‘big ideas' of taking defence relations to the next level. Rather, it is an acknowledgment that in the case of U.S. and India, close defence relations need to emerge through routine interaction, rather than be punctuated solely by major defence deals or large exercises. Such an approach should be acceptable for India's domestic politics, mollify American demands for more practical cooperation, and keep Asia reassured about deepening defence ties between these two great democracies.

( Karl F. Inderfurth is Senior Advisor and Wadhwani Chair for U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served as the Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Affairs from 1997-2001. S. Amer Latif is a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served as the Director for South Asian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2007-2011. The views reflect only those of the authors.)

India Wants To Ink The $10.4bn MMRCA Deal By December 2011

Rejecting the carping by those ejected out of the hotly-contested $10.4 billion MMRCA (medium multi-role combat aircraft) race, most notably the US, India is going full throttle to ink the "mother of all defence deals'' by December.

The aim is to ensure that deliveries of the 126 fighters begin from December 2014 onwards to stem IAF's fast-eroding combat edge. Top defence sources, in fact, said plans were afoot to base the first MMRCA squadron in the western sector, most probably at Ambala, by end-2015.

The first 18 jets will come in "fly-away condition" from the aviation major -- only Eurofighter Typhoon (EADS) and French Rafale (Dassault) are now left in contention -- finally selected for the project.

Subsequent batches of the 108 fighters, to be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) after transfer of technology, will progressively be based in other operationally relevant locations, with special focus on the eastern front with China.

"The first fighter built in HAL should roll out in December 2016. Thereafter, HAL will deliver six jets per year, which will go up to 20 per year later. HAL will achieve 85% technology absorption by the end,'' said a source.

With plans clearly chalked out, MoD ruled out any scope for comebacks by the eliminated four fighters -- American F/A-18 'Super Hornet' ( Boeing) and F-16 'Super Viper' ( Lockheed Martin), Swedish Gripen (Saab), and Russian MiG-35 ( United Aircraft Corporation).

With only Typhoon and Rafale left in the reckoning after the "gruelling and transparent'' technical and flying evaluation, MoD's Technical Oversight Committee (TOC) and Technical Offsets Evaluation Committee (TOEC) are now working to submit their reports soon.

"We should be ready to open the Typhoon and Rafale commercial bids in July,'' said the source. Thereafter, it will take another month to determine the lowest bidder (L-1) because of "huge mathematical and data verification'' of the lifecycle costs of operating the jets over a 40-year period. Commercial negotiations with the L-1 vendor will then begin before the final contract is ready for signing by December.

Asked about "points'' being raised by eliminated vendors, sources said only Rafale and Typhoon were found "compliant'' on all the 643-660 technical attributes or ASQRs (air staff qualitative requirements) laid down to meet IAF's specific operational requirements.

"Our test pilots flew 222 sorties, over 270 hours, on the six fighters in different weather conditions in India and abroad. Each vendor was informed of its jet's performance at every stage... they have no reason to complain,'' the source said.

But what about the crucial AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, which is operational only on American fighters at present? MoD said the ASQRs did "not require a flying AESA radar''. Instead, vendors had to demonstrate "a baseline radar model in flight or on a test-bed, the complete working model in a lab and how it would be integrated'' on the Indian MMRCA. "Five fighters, including Rafale and Typhoon, met this requirement,'' said the source.

Overall, MoD and IAF are confident there are "enough safeguards'' built into the project, which include "performance-based logistics'' to ensure India "gets the best machine, spares and product support''.

Eurofighter Typhoon Frontrunner To Win The $11 billion MMRCA Contract

Eurofighter Typhoon is the front-runner for the USD 11 billion contract Indian Air Force Multi-Role Combat Aircraft deal, a senior official of the BAE Systems has said indicating that if the contract goes through a part of fighter manufacturing would be off loaded to India.

"The negotiation for crucial commercial terms will begin next month," Michael Christie , Senior Vice President, BAE Systems India told a group of visiting journalists at BAE Systems' production centre at Warton, Lancashire, in UK yesterday.

India had short-listed French Dassault Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets for the project to acquire 126 fighters, while rejecting American Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, Lockheed Martin F-16, Sweden's Gripen and Russian MiG-35 fighters.

Dassault and Europefighter have been asked by the Ministry of Defence to extend the offer validity.

"If Typhoon is chosen, the order for the contract will be firmed up in the first quarter of next year and "delivery of aircraft will begin in 2015," Christie indicated.

According to Christie, Typhoon is a generation ahead of Chinese aircraft J10 Thunder.

"China also unveiled a proto-type of J20. But typhoon is one of the most advanced aircraft, The missile capability of the aircraft and radar capability are of a different level," he said.

It is built by a four-nation European consortium - Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain - with Britain and Germany having 33 per cent stake each.

Answering a question on indigenisation of HAWK, Christie said "The indigenisation programme is very successful".

India had contracted to receive 66 HAWK - 26 built in the UK and 42 under licence by HAL in Bengaluru under a 1 billion pound agreement and the contract was widened by New Delhi to purchase 57 more HAWKs under licence production.

Today, the Indian Tricolour is flying proudly outside the BAE Warton production centre, along with the British flag, thanks to the massive Indian order, which is keeping the company going.

Christie said that India is keen to have 70 per cent of the Typhoon to be produced in India and the 30 per cent in the UK.

BAE is keen to make India a partner of the Consortium, Christie said.

Asked whether India could export HAWK, Christie said, the existing agreement does not allow it.

"We are in discussion to find how we can do that". Christie said, adding, "Typhoon has taken us to the next generation of aircraft".

"If India were to finalise the agreement for Typhoon, it will be produced in Bengaluru. They will have to create new space for it in Bengaluru", he said.

Eurofighter TYPHOON Or RAFALE Your Guess As Good As Mine

Everybody in the defense sector was waiting for the MMRCA decsion from India, some in their arrogance believed it was a foregone conclusion due to the American might. I must confess I was afraid of the same thing but somewhere I had hoped that MoD would do the right thing based on the evaluation of IAF and not bow to the American pressure.

There was a lot of surprise, and considerable anguish in Washington, Stockholm and, presumably, Moscow as well as New Delhi over the decision by the Ministry of Defence to shortlist the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon in India’s $10+ billion medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) competition. The rejection of both American bids by Boeing of its F-18, and by Lockheed Martin of its F-16 have surprised many who had expected the tender to go American, and thus further consolidate military-technological ties between the United States and India. The belief was that a defence acquisition on this scale would be a political decision, and that there was limited utility in India’s courting the favourat this juncture of Western Europe or Russia. Further, many saw a decision to buy American as a quid pro quo of sorts for Washington’s providing India an exception on international civilian nuclear commerce as part of the landmark nuclear agreement between the two countries (“a 123-for-126 trade-off” in the words of one foreign diplomat in Delhi). Certainly, the allure of the MMRCA deal helped many promoters of the U.S.-India relationship in Washington push harder for close ties.

So what happened? First, just as important as political considerations is the question of which aircraft is best suited for the purposes of the Indian air force. Rigourous technical trials were conducted in various climates: Bangalore, Jaisalmer and Leh. At the Leh trials in early 2010, four aircraft performed poorly, including reportedly the two American candidates, which were said to have had trouble operating at high altitudes at such low temperatures. In fact, the final short-list should not have been a surprise: Praveen Swami reported the Eurofighter’s front-runner status after trials late last year, and over three months ago, Indian newspapers confirmed that the Eurofighter had finished first and the Rafale second with the Gripen and F-18 rounding off the top four.

Second, the spectre of corruption which looms large over the Indian defence acquisition process proved a double-edged sword for U.S. suppliers. American manufacturers and the U.S. government were fully confident that the comparative transparency of their defense sales process would give them an edge over their Russian and European competitors, still reeling from the legacies of HDW, Gorshkov and Bofors. However, the scandals raging in India related to the Commonwealth Games and the 2G spectrum auction also made it near impossible for the results of technical trials to be overruled by India’s political leaders on non-technical grounds.

Third, although the reliability of the United States as a supplier post-sales may have been an over-exaggerated concern, the United States was not seen as pliable enough on access to technology. European governments positioned themselves as far more accommodating of India’s desires to access high-technologies, and were more willing to tailor their bids to assuage Indian concerns. With both the Eurofighter and the Rafale, the likelihood of India becoming a de facto partner in joint production and development may be far greater. Washington was also seen as overly stringent on end-use monitoring, and the Indian government had been previously criticised perhaps unfairly for compromising Indian interests on that front.

Finally, American ambiguity on India’s geopolitical concerns played a role. This had at least two dimensions to it. The first was the notion perpetuated by Washington, especially by the current administration, of continued American relative decline. Despite buoyancy in many quarters in New Delhi regarding the United States’ future as a strong partner, the prevailing impression probably incorrect is that the United States is a losing investment over the long-term, even among those favourably disposed towards the United States. Second, the general drift in relations since 2008 has only increased both countries’ resolve to drive harder bargains. This period of drift was initiated by the Obama administration’s early missteps on China and Afghanistan and has persisted despite the president’s visit to India last November as a consequence of political developments in both capitals.

Moving forward: a few further considerations. First, this decision will undoubtedly have a blow back effect in Washington, providing ammunition to the many sceptics of U.S.-India relations. Second, while the MMRCA may be a landmark deal, it is not the only one, and American suppliers have steadily encroached upon the fast-growing Indian defence market. In fact, it may lead to some soul-searching on the part of the U.S. government and U.S. industry as to what they could have done better. Finally, it is not over yet. Many forget that the Dassault Rafale was considered completely out of the competition only two years ago. Previous such tenders including, most notably, a massive deal for 197 helicopters for the Indian army have been unceremoniously scrapped; in that case, the favored Eurocopter bid was tarnished and the U.S. manufacturer Bell returned to the fray. The defence minister’s unusually public warning on the subject of corruption just days ago suggests concern as much as caution.

Lets us look at some salient points of the formidable aircrafts left in the race now

AIRFRAME

Both these aircraft are very advanced delta canard config aircraft. They have seen quite some action and have been favorites of air forces all over the world. Although the aircraft look similar on the out, the airframe is completely different, and every component on it serves a different purpose.

The Typhoon is a formidably built aircraft. Its tough, has a huge canard which is placed at an angle to the ground. And its canards are up front on the nose, Now this really helps it pull up quick. What this does is that it creates a virtual tail heavy feeling for the aircraft which allows it to point its nose in any direction very quickly like the Flanker.

Another thing worth a mention is its canopy. It has a bubble canopy that offers a clear view for the pilot. The intakes are placed below the fuselage. Although these have its own benefits like ability to fly at slow speeds, they do tend to create problems at high speeds. At high speed turns, the airframe goes through great amount of stresses. But the airframe of the Typhoon is very strong, and designed in a beautiful way, and its perfectly capable of handling those stresses. The only downside is the maintenance that would be required to keep it in good shape.

One look at the wings, and its clear that the Brits wanted this to be one maneuverable machine. Everything about the aircraft screams speed and maneuverability. The wings are not straight, they are slight curved upwards to increase their strength, and be able to handle low speeds in a better way. Even the slats are controlled through powerful motor screws which require less space and move quickly and firmly. The vertical stabilizer is conventional though.

The Typhoon has a variable intake, which means that the intake on the Typhoon can open up or close a little to control the amount of air entering the engines. This is a great feature which allows the aircraft to be just as efficient at high speeds, as it is at low speeds.

When the aircraft reaches higher speeds, a lot of air at high velocities starts to enter the intakes. It becomes very difficult to combust all this air, so a lot of fuel starts to go waste, and the engine starts to lose thrust. This can be avoided by reducing the inlet size, so less air enters at high speed, and when it reaches the combustion chamber, it slows down due to the larger size of the chamber, so it ignites properly and thrust is maintained.

The Rafale is a different beast. It isn't as complex, but its sturdy. It is designed in a way that makes it look beautiful and rigid at the same time. The canards of Rafale are not as big as that of the Typhoon, and they are placed near the wings, which suggests that their is little help that the aircraft can expect of the canards. But this configuration helps the Rafale be a beautiful handler. It would be great for low altitude fast flying. At fast speeds, this configuration will offer least resistance and allow it to reach Mach 2+ speeds.

The Rafale isn't as radical as the Typhoon. It uses conventional technology in its airframe. Everything about it is tried and tested. And it wouldn't be as maneuverable as Typhoon. In fact, Typhoon would be miles above Rafale when it comes to maneuverability.

The intakes on the Rafale are also conventional. They look cool but there isn't anything revolutionary about it. It isn't a bad thing, but the Typhoon takes the cake here too.

ENGINES

The Typhoon’s twin EJ200 engines each produce about 13,500 pounds of dry thrust (and more than 20,000 pounds in full afterburner), which bequeath the aircraft with a higher thrust-to-weight ratio at high subsonic speed (at low altitude) than any of its competitors, save the F-16 (without conformal fuel tanks).

Why couldn't Dassault put in a bigger engine? Maybe because it didn't need it. The current engines on the Rafale are fine, BUT when compared to the latest 4.5 gen aircraft, the thrust does seem to be on the lower side. The Snecma M88-2 engines with 50 KN dry thrust and 75 KN thrust with afterburners are high efficiency engines but with lower thrust. Dassault has promised to replace the engines with high thrust engines, but since its not here yet, we shouldn't consider them

The Typhoon again wins the round hands down.

AVIONICS

The Typhoon has a CAPTOR radar, which is a mechanically steered Pulse Doppler radar. Now most of the people who know something about radars would know that this is an old technology. In fact technology wise, these type of radars are two generation behind the AESAs and one generation behind the PESAs. But what Eurofighter has done is that they have tweaked it, increased the size of the antenna and that has increased its performance by a lot. It can detect aircraft sized targets at ranges up to 160 kms. But since its a MSA radar, it also has a few disadvantages. It can not scan many targets at a time, and it can be jammed. It has the ability to interleave, this I think I will discuss sometime later.

The Rafale on the other hand scores nicely here. Its RBE2 radar is a PESA radar which is a good thing. But the size of the nose of Rafale restricts the radar sizes which makes the radar detect aircraft sized targets at a range of 140-150 kms. The radar gets beaten by the Typhoon in range, but it does make up for it in technology. The radar is completely automated. When in interceptor mode, it automatically selects high, medium or low pulse repetition frequencies for best reception. The radar will soon be replaced by an AESA variant, which would have a range of 160-170 kms and would be very advanced, the same can not be said about Typhoon. An AESA variant is planned for Typhoon also but recent reports suggest that it may not be shipped on Tranche 3, but could be available as an upgrade.

The radar is a tie here. Both are good radars, nothing groundbreaking about them.

Typhoon “compensates” for the current lack of an operational AESA radar with a superb IRST system possibly the world’s best—called the Passive Infra-Red Airborne Tracking Equipment (PIRATE).
The PIRATE system is capable of detecting targets at distances approaching that of conventional radars. It combines a long-range IRST sensor operating in the long-wave infrared band with a FLIR thermal imager that is capable of passively searching, tracking and designating targets for weapons launch. All system data is seamlessly integrated with the information collected by other sensors to provide the pilot with a unified track for each target.

The Typhoon’s DAS, called the Defensive Aids Sub-System (DASS), also contributes to enhancing the pilot’s overall situational awareness. Incorporating a wideband RWR and ESM system (which provides 360 degree coverage and can locate adversary emitters with angular accuracies of less than a degree), a
MAWS, a self-protection jammer, and ARTDs in addition to the usual cha ff and flares, the Typhoon’s DAS completes the incredible tactical information suite that provides its pilot with usable, correlated data about the threats facing the aircraft. The principal weakness of this system currently is the lack of a DRFM-based jammer, but the Euro fighter consortium expects to incorporate this capability in the future.

RADAR CROSS SECTION REDUCTION FEATURES

The Eurofighter Typhoon has implemented several features to reduce the frontal rcs of the aircraft. But mind you, its just the frontal rcs that is reduced. From the side, the rcs is comparable to other modern aircraft. The frontal rcs should be a 0.5-1 sq meter. A lot of people expect it to be 0.1, which is almost impossible and more of a net rumor.

The rcs would be reduced further if an AESA is employed.

The Rafale on the other hand has a higher rcs due to less composites used. The shape of the airframe is another problem. It should have a much higher rcs from sides too. The rcs of Rafale should be around 1.5-2 sq meter.

ARMAMENT

This is a very important aspect of a fighter aircraft. And both the Eurocanards have recently employed new missiles.

The Typhoon’s weapons suite potentially brings new capabilities to the IAF as well. The aircraft can deploy the U.S. AIM-9L Sidewinder, the longer-ranged ASRAAM (which utilizes an IIR seeker originally developed by Hughes but is otherwise a British weapon), and the multinational IRIS-T for the WVR
air combat role. For the BVR mission, the Typhoon carries the U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM, possibly the best all-round active radar missile operational in the world. The even longer ranged MBDA Meteor would
supplement the AMRAAM once it becomes operational. It is not certain that the ASRAAM and the Meteor would be available to India, however.

In the air-to-ground role, the Typhoon will carry all modern precision munitions ranging from laser-guided bombs to various kinds of cruise missiles and SEAD weapons. Just like the Rafale and the Gripen, the
Typhoon carries a wide variety of munitions manufactured by various countries. However, this could create a problem, in that not all systems capable of being carried by the aircraft would be available to India because of export restrictions. Unfortunately, this is more frequently the case with the best weapons

Although the exported version of the Rafale will not bring all the weapons supported in French employ, it will bring at least two superb but extremely expensive AAMs that India does not currently possess: the MICA-IR, with its IIR seeker, and the MICA-AR, with its active radar sensor. When employed with a helmet-mounted sight, the MICA-IR provides the Rafale with high o ff-boresight and lock-on after launch capabilities, and while the MICA-AR is not the longest-range BVR active radar missile on the market, it has exceptional
maneuverability and electronic counter-countermeasures capability. Although the Rafale will eventually employ the longer-range active radar BVR missile, the Meteor, it is uncertain whether this weapon would be exported to India.

With the Damocles targeting pod, the Rafale will be able to deliver a variety of laser-guided bombs, and it will carry other precision strike weapons such as the Apache-AP and the SCALP-EG as well, though, again, it is not clear whether some of these systems will be exported to India. In the surface strike role, the Rafale has clear advantages: it is designed for high speed, low level attack operations, is capable of terrain following, and has a world-class integrated EW suite that provides both enhanced protection and attack capabilities. Irrespective of what weapons the Rafale carries, the versatility of its avionics system is remarkable. It permits the pilot to shift e ffortlessly from air-to-air to air-to-ground missions during a single sortie, while o ffering easy management of information, great situational awareness, and multi-target engagement capability in an airframe characterized by superb handling.

Many people believe that Typhoon isn't a very capable Air-ground platform, but this isn't true. Typhoons are perfectly capable of taking out any ground mission. The problem is with training of pilots. The number of pilots flying Typhoon are very low, and they have not been trained for ground missions. Only a minority of pilots are capable of it as of now.

Something that deserves a mention here is the SPECTRA system on Rafale. It is a software system that increases the chances of survival for the aircraft but automating most of the tasks. It allows seamless integration and communication with other aircraft and ground assets. The Spectra electronic countermeasures system is fully internal and provides radar warning receiver (RWR), active jamming, infrared missile approach warning, laser detection and chaff/flare. Data from Spectra is also "data fused" and fed into the pilot's tactical display. Additionally, the system can be rapidly reprogrammed by frontline ground technicians, as demonstrated operationally in Afghanistan. Typhoon also has a capable EW suite but SPECTRA is believed to be a bit better.

So this round is another tie.

CONCLUSION

As is to be expected from the foregoing discussion, the Typhoon displays excellent aerodynamic effectiveness. But this judgment must be qualified when comparing it to its peers not because it is deficient in any particular way but because its competitors are for most part superb dog  fighting platforms as well.

Where sustained turn rate, for example, is concerned, the Typhoon is superior to the MiG-35 and the Rafale, but yet cannot match the Gripen, which beats it and all other aircraft irrespective of altitude. The Typhoon also turns somewhat slower than the F-16IN (without conformal tanks) and the F/A-18E/F at most representative altitudes. The Typhoon’s instantaneous turn performance is far better than the MiG-35 and the Gripen and comparable to the F-16IN (without conformal tanks) and F/A-18E/F at all altitudes, but inferior to the Rafale the closer both aircraft are to sea level. Typhoon’s bleed rates are high, comparable to the Rafale and the F/A-18E/F at all altitudes, but inferior to the Gripen and the F-16IN (even when the latter flies with its conformal fuel tanks).

On balance, then, while the Typhoon is an agile aircraft, it is aerodynamically comparable to the Rafale and the MiG-35, but is not as nimble as the Gripen, with the F-16IN (without its conformal fuel tanks) and the F/A-18E/F falling somewhere in the middle. Pilot quality will, therefore, be critical for success in most air-to-air encounters with these airplanes, though the quality of sensor fusion in the Typhoon will certainly make its occupant’s
life easier in the stressful circumstances of air combat. Typhoon has a high top-end speed, putting it in the same league with the MiG-35 and the F-16IN. Lastly, the Typhoon’s performance characteristics will certainly permit it to undertake all the theater-level missions to which it may be committed within South Asia, though it will almost certainly require, at the very least, external tanks for the anti-surface mission.

The foregoing advantages of the Typhoon, however, come with two significant liabilities where the MMRCA competition is concerned. The  first challenge will be manifested in the arena of technology transfer. Although many European diplomats have blithely asserted that transferring high-end aviation technology to India “will not be a problem,” such claims must be taken with a pinch of salt. Because the Typhoon is produced by a four-
country consortium, each with di erent strengths, different political interests and different responsibilities, securing agreement on an extensive technology transfer package to India will be more difficult than the casual commentary sometimes suggests.

This remains true despite the fact that Germany is the lead country responsible for the Euro fighter Consortium’s India campaign. If the Typhoon wins the MMRCA competition, it is likely that the aircraft o ffered to India will be taken from the Luftwaffe’s planned acquisition in much the same way that the 72 aircraft sold to Saudi Arabia came from the Royal Air Force’s allotment.

Yet getting all four countries involved in the Typhoon’s development to agree on a transfer of technology package to India—especially since New Delhi’s requirement is far more ambitious than anything the Saudis demanded—will prove to be challenging.

Eurofighter consortium will have little di fficulty agreeing to the co-production of the Typhoon in India. Indeed, it has already done so in Saudi Arabia. However, at a time when Europe is struggling with global competition from the United States, Russia, and now even China, there is cause to doubt that it will agree to share its expertise in sensor fusion, flight control systems, and advanced weaponry. Whether the consortium will be able to satisfy
India’s direct o sets demands is also unclear. It is easy to imagine the four nations involved enthusiastically agreeing to indirect offsets, if those were required; reaching a consensus on direct o ffsets will prove more di difficult, particularly in light of the aircraft’s high unit flyaway costs.

The second challenge facing the Typhoon is exactly the one just referred to:Price. The Typhoon remains the most expensive aircraft in the MMRCA competition, coming in at close to $125 million a copy. Whether the IAF can actually afford the Typhoon—even if the aircraft remains its   first preference—then becomes a critical question because a purchase of such magnitude could upend the service’s budget at a time when critical questions about technology transfer still remain unanswered.

For all its impressive qualities, the Rafale is a likely to be an extraordinarily expensive aircraft,costing somewhere in the region of $85 million a copy, second only to the Eurofighter. The continual upgrades that Dassault has proposed to bring the aircraft up to F3+ standards has, therefore, perplexed many industry observers because the smaller French aircraft production runs already raise unit costs considerably above their foreign counterparts. This ends up making the Rafale costly to begin with, which partly explains why it has lost out in every foreign competition thus far. Attempting to compensate for this outcome by incorporating more sophisticated technology ends up making the airplane even more expensive, especially compared with other twin-engine  fighters that provide comparable capability at lesser cost. European industry sources also emphasize the Rafale’s high maintenance requirements, which are
certain to add significantly to its life cycle costs.

Given this fact, Dassault will have to sweeten the pot in the MMRCA competition by offering a highly attractive technology transfer package to India. Whether the company can actually transfer its most precious capabilities, for example, in radar, IRST, sensor fusion, long-range weaponry,and engines, does not require any guesses. India’s experience with the Mirage 2000 has shown that, while the French have been very good in providing spares and support for their aircraft,even aircraft maintenance has yielded little by way of true transfers of either knowledge or expertise. It is also unclear whether Dassault will be able to meet the ambitious o ffsets requirements in the MMRCA competition, in part because the Indian Mirage 2000 upgrade
program—the most obvious candidate for satisfying these considerations—will be concluded long before the winning MMRCA platform is selected. In any event, the incredible costs of the Mirage 2000 upgrade program—believed to now run at more than $35 million per aircraft—only highlights
the traditional weakness of French combat aviation, namely its atrociously high prices that produce a poor cost-to-value ratio.

If you have to sum-up the Typhoon is slightly better than Rafale. If a good AESA radar is added to its arsenal it will be one of the best fighter aircraft but the spectre of dealing with 4 different countries about various technologies is not only difficult but messy. On the bright side whichever aircraft India chooses we will get a damn good fighter plane.(My vote is with Typhoon)

MMRCA Debate By Ashok K Mehta

Writer Ashok K Mehta

The F16 is a 40-year-old single-engine aircraft which has been the mainstay of the Pakistani Air Force while the F18 did not fulfil the IAF's parameters.

The President of the USA, Mr Barack Obama, described ‘Operation Geronimo’ as “one of the greatest intelligence military operations in our nation’s history. We got Osama”. But a month earlier, Mr Obama lost out — at least so far — on the other prize he had eyed: India’s multi-million-dollar order for Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft.

In a letter dated February 4, 2011 to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Mr Obama wrote: “Let me reassure you that the US is a willing, capable and reliable defence partner to India. High-tech defence sales are increasingly a cornerstone of our strategic partnership. I want to underscore the strategic importance the United States attaches to the selection of a US proposal in India’s MMRCA competition. The US is offering India two of the most advanced multi-mission combat aircraft in the world — the Boeing FA/18IN and the Lockheed Martin F16IN. These aircraft have a demonstrated qualitative military advantage over any current fourth generation plus aircraft… I view the MMRCA acquisition as a key step along this path. I respectfully ask that your Government will give its full consideration to the commercial, technical and strategic merit to the US proposal.”

Two months later, the upfront rejection by India of both the Boeing F18 and Lockheed Martin F16 is a strategic error. Many defence experts expected the F18 to be sneaked into the shortlist along with the European Typhoon and the French Rafale to make the competition trans-Atlantic and politically more vibrant.

Many reasons are being given for keeping the American aircraft out, the most obvious being that they are not up to scratch. The F16 is a 40-year-old single-engine aircraft with a psychological hangover for the Indian Air Force — it has been the mainstay of the Pakistani Air Force for four decades. The F18 did not fulfil all of the IAF’s technical parameters but the twin-engine aircraft could have been included in deference to the India-US strategic partnership and to keep the price negotiations on an even keel.

The Eurofighter is priced at around $125 million while the Rafale is $85 million. Less than $50 million, the F18 could have forced some markdown of the European contenders, inducing additionally cuts in lifecycle costs. The two aircraft selected have been asked to review their price bids. The final selection will be a political and strategic decision not necessarily based on the lowest bid and will be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

The IAF favours the Rafale not the least because the French are promising the moon. There is also a high level back channel Italian connection, they say. The Rafale will bestow several advantages — facilitate the Mirage 2000 upgrade programme; slip fit into the existing operational and logistics infrastructure of Mirage 2000. Snecma, which has built the Rafale engine, is also the company which provides engines for Mirage 2000, so that is a bonus. The Rafale though is not in service of any other air force except that of France.

Similarly of the four countries that have developed the Typhoon, three — Britain, Italy and Spain — have decided to go in for the fifth generation F35 being developed by the US. The British RAF is pounding Col Gaddafi with the Typhoon.

The $10 million MMRCA contract was expected to generate 27,000 jobs and boost the flagging defence industry in the US. But the history of India-US defence relationship has not been a happy one. Except for the purchase of the Packet aircraft by the IAF in 1962, no other aircraft has been acquired. The IAF has relied on British, French and mainly Soviet/Russian origin fleets.

The US has not stood by India and imposed sanctions on it in 1974, after the Pokhran I peaceful nuclear explosion, and again in 1998, after the Pokhran II nuclear tests. Ironically, the nuclear tests revived defence ties but India was still wary that the US would turn off the tap as it had in the case of spares of Westland Sea-King helicopters, Navy ALH engines, etc. In 2004, when India signed the Hawk jet trainer contract with the UK, the clause that there will be no US parts was inserted on India’s insistence which led to time and cost overruns.

As WikiLeaks has revealed, India had the word ‘strategic’ removed from the text of the Defence Framework Agreement of 2005 with the US, so high was the level of distrust. India has evaded signing many of the several obligatory agreements going by difficult acronyms like CISMOA, BECA, SOFA, EUMA and so on which accompany high-tech equipment and convert a partnership into a de facto alliance relationship. They entail interoperability, end-user inspections and verifications and periodic certification on legitimate use of equipment and supplies.

Till 2005, India had acquired military supplies from the US worth less than $500 million which included 12 weapon-locating radars — this one single deal taking 15 years to fructify after a tortuous scrutiny of India’s bona fides. Since then, the US has sold (or will sell) equipment worth $15 billion through the FMS route which ensures probity and transparency. The huge jump in US defence sales has turned the corner as far as reliability of American defence supplies is concerned.

Why have technical considerations alone trumped political and strategic imperatives of the MMRCA contract? The US Ambassador to India, Mr Timothy Roemer, who announced his resignation the day after the decision to reject the American bid, said, “I am deeply disappointed but respect the selection process.” Analysts believe awarding the contract to a European fighter is political balancing: The US has won $15 billion worth of contracts and Russia already hogs defence purchases and has been awarded the fifth generation fighter deal. So Europe is the obvious choice for spreading the largesse, given it has a first rate fourth generation aircraft.

The door seems to have been closed for American aircraft by not including the F18 in the short list which would have been politically correct and would also have recognised the White House missive. Maybe it was the presidential letter and the WikiLeaks cable indicating how craven Indian officials are with American diplomats. The Left has consistently accused the Manmohan Singh Government of having sold out to the US.

Ruling out US aircraft reflects strategic autonomy certainly, but the game could have been played more optimally by making it a three-horse race.

MMRCA Vendors On War Path

The elimination of four aircraft vendors from the $9.5 billion global competition to sell 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) to the Indian Air Force has not been accepted quietly. Business Standard has learned that the ministry of defence (MoD) has already received letters from all four inquiring why their fighters were found unfit.

The first inquiry was from Russia, asking why the IAF had found the MiG-35 unsuitable. Next was the US Embassy in New Delhi, asking for the specific reasons that had led to the elimination of the two American fighters, the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet; and the Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper. MoD sources also confirm that Sweden’s Gripen International has written in, seeking details of why the fancied Gripen NG fighter was ruled out.

Earlier, on 27th April, the MoD had written to the four vendors briefly outlining, but not detailing, the reasons for their elimination. The remaining two vendors --- Eurofighter GmbH; and Dassault of France --- were asked to extend the validity of their price bids, given two years earlier.

Vendor protests after elimination from a tender would usually be rejected as a pro forma exercise. This time, however, a MoD procedural error could provide vendors with a lever to claw their way back into contention. The MoD’s Technical Oversight Committee (TOC), which must review the IAF’s technical evaluation and flight trials to ascertain that procurement procedures were followed in full, had not completed its work before the MoD sent out the rejection letters.

It remains unclear why the MoD sent out its rejection letters before the TOC had ensured full compliance with procedures. Now, the three-man TOC --- headed by the Scientific Advisor to the Raksha Mantri (SA to RM), VK Saraswat, and with Bharat Electronics Ltd chief, Ashwini Datt and the IAF’s Air Marshall Anil Chopra as members --- is scrambling to complete this mandatory review. Emailed a questionnaire by Business Standard, the MoD has not responded.

Aviation experts apprehend that this procedural lacuna could be exploited by one of the “politically influential vendors” (read Boeing and Lockheed Martin) to re-enter contention. Senior IAF officers, however, emphatically rule out selecting either American fighter. Says an IAF officer involved in the selection process: “The US companies, which flaunt their technological leadership, are feigning hurt that their fighters were found technologically unsuitable. But it was their misjudgement to offer the IAF fighters like the F-16 and the F-18 that are decades old. It is arrogance to claim that these have been modernised and are good enough for a country like India. But, if they wanted to argue technology, they should have fielded the F-35.”

The Russian vendor, RAC MiG, is also upset with the IAF’s rejection but for another reason. “The MiG-35 has been developed in Russia as a natural replacement for the 2000-odd MiG-21s that are in coming to the end of their service lives in tens of air forces around the world. With the IAF --- a bastion of MiG fighters --- rejecting the MiG-35, the Russian builder worries about the negative signal that this will send across the world,” points out Pushpindar Singh, aerospace expert and editor-in-chief of the trade magazine, Vayu.

Meanwhile, Gripen International is fine-tuning its strategy for appealing the IAF’s rejection. According to the MoD’s letter to the company, the Gripen NG was found non-compliant with the IAF’s tender requirements on 51 counts, of which 43 relate to the critical Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar. Gripen International argues that it is unfair to say that the IAF has not been provided “proof of technology”, or proof that the Gripen NG’s Selex AESA radar (which is still under development) has surmounted the key technological obstacles needed for operationalising it in time for delivery to India. That is because Selex (in partnership with Euroradar) is also developing the Eurofighter’s AESA radar, which the IAF has accepted as technologically viable, and likely to be ready in time for delivery to India. Gripen points out that if Selex has convinced the IAF about having mastered the technology for the Eurofighter’s AESA radar, that same technology will drive the Gripen NG’s radar.

But IAF sources reveal that Gripen failed to provide proof that their AESA radar development was on track and that they could integrate that radar on a fighter. In contrast, Dassault had fitted two prototype AESA radars on Rafale fighters, proving that they were close to completion. Eurofighter too test-flew a prototype AESA radar for the IAF evaluation team, convincing them that it would be ready by 2014-15.

So far, all six vendors had conspicuously praised the MMRCA technical and flight evaluation procedures, declaring that this was the most professionally handled competitive procurement that they had ever encountered anywhere. Now, clearly, the gloves are off.

अस्वीकृत मध्यम बहु भूमिका लड़ाकू विमान विक्रेताओं ने रक्षा मंत्रालय के वीरुध छेड़ दी जंग

लेखक सुदीप मुखर्जी

कहते है जहां पैसा होता है वहाँ परेशानियाँ और भी अधिक होती है जैसे जैसे हमारे मिग-21 विमान अपने कार्य काल के अंत पर पहुच रहे थे वैसे वैसे भारतीय वायुसेना की चिंताए बड़ रही थी , तेजस जिसपर कई लोगों की आशाएँ थी वह 17 साल बाद अभी भी ठीक से तयार नहीं था अत: वायुसेना ने विदेशी लड़ाकू विमानो के लिए आग्रह किया कई सालों के टाल मटोल के बाद भारत ने $9.5 अरब अंतरराष्ट्रीय प्रतिस्पर्धा की घोषणा कर दी , इतना बड़ा अनुबंध शायद ही किसिने देखा था । अम्रीका जो अब अपने को भारत का परम मित्र मानता है तुरंत दबाव बनाने लगा अपने ऐफ-16आईएन सुपर वाइपर और ऐफ/ए-18 सुपर होर्नेट के लिए। उसे लगा की इस नए परिवेश मे भारत उसकी के साथ अनुबंध करेगा।


उधर रूस हमारा पुराना साथी और सबसे बड़ा सैन्य सामाग्री का विक्रेता मिग-35 ले कर तयार था उसे भरोसा था की मिग-21 उड़ाने वाले वायुसेना को मिग-35 भी पसंद आयेगा। क्यूंकी दोनों हवाई जहाज एक ही कंपनी के है अत: भारत को नया कुछ नहीं सीखना पड़ेगा तथा मिग-35 सबसे सस्ता विमान था ।


हाल ही मे हमने इंग्लैंड से बाज़ जेट ट्रेनर खरीदा है और इंग्लैंड के त्यफून यूरोफाइटर का हाल बहुत बुरा था उसके पास कोई खास खरीदार नहीं था अगर उन्हे यह अनुबंध मिल जाता है तो उनकी कंपनी का बेड़ा पार हो जायेगा तो उन्होने भी कमर कस ली ।


फ्रांस इस बात से बहुत खुश था की उसने हमे कई साल पहले मिराज 2000 बेचे थे और राफेल मे भी वैसी ही लेकिन अत्याधुनिक तकनीक का प्रयोग किया गया है उसे भरोसा था की भारत की वायुसेना जो मिराज की दीवानी है वह इस अत्यंत आधुनिक किन्तु सबसे महेंगे विमान को पसंद करेगी।


एक और खिलाड़ी था स्वीडन का गृपेन जो की अत्याधुनिक होने के साथ साथ बहुत ही व्यावहारिक विमान है , उसे हवाई अड्डे के विपरीत किसे भी सड़क पर उतारा जा सकता है ।


सभी ने अपने अपने तरीके से सभी प्रकार के हथकंडे अपना लिए । इंग्लैंड के प्रधानमंत्री से लेकर अम्रीका के राष्ट्रपति तक सबने अपना ज़ोर लगाया । किन्तु अंत मे जो दो विजेता निकले उसके कारण कई लोगों को बहुत अचरज हुया ।

राफेल और यूरोफाइटर बहुत महेंगे और बहुत कम प्रयोग मे किए जाने वाले विमान है  फ्रांस और इंग्लैंड के सिवाए इन विमानो का प्रयोग केवल 3 और देश करते है वह भी इसलिए क्यूंकी इन सब ने मिलकर यूरोफाइटर बनाया था । तथा यूरोफाइटर पूर्णत: बहू भूमिका लड़ाकू विमान नहीं है वह जमीन पर हमला करने मे सक्षम नहीं है और नहीं उसके पास AESA राडार है ।

चार विमान विक्रेताओं ने जिनहे भारतीय वायु सेना के लिए 126 मध्यम बहु भूमिका लड़ाकू विमान (एमएमआरसीए) के $9.5 अरब अंतरराष्ट्रीय प्रतिस्पर्धा मे अयोग्य घोषित किया गया था उन्हे यह निर्णय स्वीकार नहीं है। पता चला है की इन चारों ने रक्षा मंत्रालय से लिखित मे पूछा है कि इनके लड़ाकू विमानो को क्यू अयोग्य बताया गया।


सबसे पहला प्रश्न रूस कि तरफ से उसके विमान मिग-35 को लेके था उसके बाद अमरीका के दूतावास ने ठीक ठीक कारण जानने चाहे कि उनके लॉकहीड मार्टिन ऐफ-16आईएन सुपर वाइपर और बोइंग ऐफ/ए-18 सुपर होर्नेट मे क्या कमी थी। ठीक उसके बाद स्वीडन ने भी अपने जंगी विमान ग्रिपपेन के बारे मे भी पूछा है ।


27 अप्रैल को रक्षा मंत्रालय ने इन चारों को एक पत्र मे अपना निर्णय बताया था जिसमे कोई भी जानकारी विस्तार से नहीं दी गयी थी । मजेदार बात यह है कि कानून के हिसाब से रक्षा मंत्रालय तब तक अपना फैसला नहीं सुनाता है जब तक न उसकी अपनी तकनीकी पर्यवेक्षण समिति यह जांच कर लेती है की इस पूरे कांट्रैक्ट मे सारे नियमो का पालन हुया है की नहीं किन्तु इस बार बिना इस समिति के अंतिम रिपोर्ट के ही रक्षा मंत्रालय ने अपना फैसला सबको बता दिया । चरों विक्रेता इसको एक भूल मानते है और उसका फाइदा उठाना चाहते है।


विमानन विशेषज्ञों को भय है कि इस प्रक्रियात्मक कमी का लाभ राजनीतिक रूप से प्रभावशाली विक्रेताओं के द्वारा शोषण किया जा सकता है (इशारा बोइंग और लॉकहीड मार्टिन की तरफ है ) । किन्तु वरिष्ठ वायुसेना अधिकारियों ने अमरीका के दिखावे के दुख का जोरदार विरोध किया है , उनका कहना है के दोनों ऐफ-16 और ऐफ/ऐ-18 दशकों पुराने विमान है और अमरीका ने अपने घमंड मे और हमारी वायुसेना को नीच मानते हुये ऐसे पुराने और हीन हवाई जहाज प्रतिस्पर्धा मे उतारे और अगर वह इतने ही आतुर थे हमारे साथ सौदा करने के लिए तो उन्हे ऐफ-35 मैदान मे उतारना चाहिए था ।


रूसी विक्रेता, आर. ए. सी मिग भी भारतीय वायुसेना अस्वीकृति के साथ परेशान है, लेकिन एक और कारण के लिए। 2000 मिग-21 जो कि दुनिया भर के दसियों वायु सेना में है उनकी सेवा जीवन का अंत हो राहा है । मिग-35 को मिग-21 के प्राकृतिक प्रतिस्थापन के रूप में रूस में विकसित किया गया है. भारतीय वायु सेना जो की मिग-21 का एक गड़ है... अगर वह मिग-35 को खारिज कर देता है, तो यह नकारात्मक संकेत है जो कि यह दुनिया भर में भेजा जाएगा और यही बात रूसी बिल्डर के लिए चिंता का विषय है।


ग्रिपेन भी भारतीय वायुसेना की अस्वीकृति के वीरुध अपील करने के लिए अपनी रणनीति बना राहा है . रक्षा मंत्रालय ने कंपनी को जो पत्र भेजा था उसके अनुसार, ग्रिपेन भारतीय वायुसेना के 51 माप दण्ड मे असफल राहा, जिनमे से 43 महत्वपूर्ण क्रियात्मक इलेक्ट्रॉनिक स्कैन सरणी रडार (AESA) सक्रिय करने से संबंधित है। ग्रिपेन इंटरनेशनल का तर्क है कि उसने भारतीय वायुसेना को "प्रौद्योगिकी का सबूत" दिया था। उसने यह बात साबित कर दिया है कि "ग्रिपेन एनजी सेलेक्स AESA रडार (जो अभी भी विकास्र्त है) प्रौद्योगिकीय बाधाओं को पार कर चुका है और भारत को युद्धक विमान देने के पूर्व इस राडार को विमान पर जोड़ दिया जायेगा। इसका एक बहुत बड़ा कारण है कि सेलेक्स यूरोराडार के साथ साझेदारी में है जो यूरोफाइटर का AESA राडार निर्मित कर राहा है। इस राडार को भारतीय वायु सेना ने तकनीकी रूप से व्यावहारिक माना है, और संभावना के रूप में स्वीकार किया है कि भारत को यूरोफाइटर देने के पूर्व यह राडार पूर्णत विकसित हो चुका होगा । ग्रिपेन का तर्क यह है की अगर सेलेक्स ने भारतीय वायुसेना को साबित कर दिया है की उसने यूरोफाइटर AESA राडार के लिए प्रौद्योगिकी में महारत हासिल कर ली है तो वही तकनीक ग्रिपपेन के रेडार मे भी प्रयोग मे आयेगी तो फिर ग्रिपपेन के रेडार को क्यू असफल माना गया और यूरोफाइटर के राडार को सफल।


लेकिन भारतीय वायु सेना के सूत्रों के मुताबिक ग्रिपेन सबूत देने में असफल रहा। वह यह तथ्य साबित नहीं कर पाया कि उनका AESA राडार समय पर विकसित हो जाएगा तथा हमे देने से पहले उस राडार को लड़ाकू विमान के साथ एकीकृत कर दिया जायेगा। इसके विपरीत, फ्रांस के दस्सौल्ट ने अपने राडार को साबित करने के लिए दो लड़ाकू विमान उड़ाए जिन पर उनका AESA रेडार लगा था जिसके कारण भारतीय वायुसेना को भरोसा है की उनका राडार पूरा होने के करीब है। यूरोफाइटर ने भी भारतीय वायुसेना के मूल्यांकन समिति के लिए एक प्रोटोटाइप AESA राडार लगा कर अपना विमान उड़ाया जिसके कारण मूल्यांकन समिति ने यह माना कि राडार 2014-15 तक तैयार हो जाएगा.


इसी बीच डॉ सुब्रमनियम स्वामी ने घोषणा की है कि सोनिया गांधी ने वायुसेना पर दबाव बनाया और उसे बाध्य किया की वह फ्रांस के राफ़ाइल को चुने। इसमे कितनी बात सच है या झूठ वह तो साबित नहीं हुआ किन्तु स्वामी जी ने भारत के प्रधानमंत्री को एमएमआरसीए की खरीद पर रोक लगा देने का आग्रह किया है ।


कुछ दिनो पहले तक सभी विक्रेतायोन ने भारत एमएमआरसीए की तकनीकी और उड़ान मूल्यांकन प्रक्रिया की प्रशंसा की थी, और यह घोषणा भी कर दी कि यह सबसे पेशेवर प्रतिस्पर्धात्मक खरीद है जो उन्होने पहले कभी नहीं देखि, जाहिर है निर्णय आने के बाद शायद उनका मन बदल गया।


अभी इस अनुबंध मे आगे क्या क्या होगा वह तो भगवान ही जानता है किन्तु यह तो तय है की अम्रीका इस निर्णय को आसानी से नहीं मानेगा और कही न कही इसकी भरपाई करने की कोशिश करेगा 

US Wants More Data On Fighter Setback From India

India has agreed to provide the United States with more information about its decision last week to drop two US defence companies from an $11 billion fighter competition, a top US official said on Tuesday.

Assistant secretary of state Andrew Shapiro reiterated the US government's deep disappointment about India's decision, but he said Washington was still pursuing other defence sales with India that could strengthen ties between the two countries.

"Going forward, it's important to recognize that we have a number of sales either in the pipeline or to be considered that will enable us to continue to build the defence trade relationship," Shapiro told a group of business executives who are advising the state department on export control reforms.

"Our strategic relationship is far greater than any one sale," he said.

India last week eliminated Chicago-based Boeing Co's FA-18 SuperHornet and Bethesda, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin Corp's F-16 from a competition to provide 126 fighters.

Instead, it short-listed the Eurofighter made by Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain, and France's Rafale for the $11 billion contract.

But US arms makers are still jockeying for an estimated $50 billion in sales to India, which plans to modernise its Soviet-era military equipment and technology.

Over the past three years, India has agreed to buy some $10 billion in US military hardware, including six Lockheed C-130J military transport aircraft and eight long-range Boeing P-8 maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft.

Shapiro cited those agreements, and said Washington remained in discussions with India about additional sales of C-130 planes, C-17 cargo planes built by Boeing, and an array of helicopters, as well as other advanced systems.

MMRCA Rumors Reasons Rejection

Industry insiders have reported that Europeans willingness to transfer technology has most likely helped them emerge as the short-listed rivals for India's Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) program, Some US companies concede that the Indian Air Force's technical requirements were the deciding factor.
The Indian government did not explain why it ruled out the Swedish Saab JAS-39 Gripen, the Russian MiG-35, and two U.S.-built jets, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper, from the $10 billion, 126-aircraft program. Instead, the news was passed April 27 to the jet-makers' national governments, irking at least some U.S. industry players.

"The way the decision was made and announced has only made things worse: They knew full well the importance the administration attached to this sale. A quiet intimation of the coming decision would have helped considerably. It was really unfortunate that this was not done," said Ashley Tellis, an analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

A Indian Defence Ministry source said the decision was based on technical evaluations and flight tests, not political considerations or influence. Defence Minister A.K. Antony insisted that the selection be based on merit alone, the source said.

Several analysts said that while the U.S. had allowed its jet makers to offer unprecedented access to technology, European contenders probably pledged more.

"The most likely explanation is that the Europeans wanted and needed it more. They were willing to bend over backwards in terms of technology transfer, in terms of industrial work share and in terms of other regulatory issues, and they really needed this," said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst at the Teal Group, Fairfax, Va. "For the U.S. contractors, it would have been gravy, but for the Europeans, it's survival through the end of the decade."

Tellis said the choice merely reflected the Indian Air Force's (IAF) technical preferences."The down-select decision clearly represents the IAF's choice, which the MoD has obviously gone along with as expected," he said.

One senior U.S. administration official agreed."I wouldn't see the technology release issue as the clincher," he said. "This was a judgment made on the basis of the technical qualification requirements that the Indian Air Force had established as part of the procurement."

He said the two U.S. aircraft had failed to meet certain Indian technical criteria."India would have been well-served to take a more comprehensive look at the transaction," he said.

But the official also conceded there were certain technologies that the U.S. simply would not share. "We have a defense licensing system which is consistent with the law of the land, and there are certain technologies we're simply not going to hand over. That's just a fact of life," he said.

One U.S. industry official noted that Indian officials had publicly asserted that viable contenders would have an operational active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, something only the F/A-18/E/F and F-16IN possess. The European contenders are developing AESA arrays.

"Yet, it seems that the IAF and MoD made the decision based on strategic, political grounds, not technical merits," the official said.

Several analysts said India has not forgotten that the U.S. imposed sanctions on the country after a 1990s nuclear test, nor that Washington is working to bolster ties with arch-enemy Pakistan.

Bhim Singh, an analyst and retired IAF wing commander, predicted that the rejection of Boeing and Lockheed Martin wouldn't hurt bilateral defense ties.

But Tellis said there would be repercussions."I think the Obama administration will be deeply disappointed with this decision - as will the Congress. I think U.S.-India defense relations have been in trouble for a while. I suspect this will make things more difficult," he said.

Will the Europeans Beat The Yanks To the Post

With European fighters surging ahead of the American jets in the hotly-contested race to bag the gigantic $10.4 billion project to supply 126 medium multi-role fighter aircraft (MMRCA), India has now virtually shortlisted or "down-selected" two out of the six contenders in the fray.

Eurofighter Typhoon

Sources said Eurofighter Typhoon (backed by UK, Germany, Spain and Italy) and French Rafale are the ones most likely to figure in the shortlist of the jets which have met the technical requirements, even though US has been hard-selling its F/A-18 'Super Hornet' and F-16 'Falcon' jets. The other two are the Swedish Gripen and Russian MiG-35.

Though there was no official word from the defence ministry on Wednesday, sources said the sealed commercial bids of the shortlisted aviation majors will now be opened for the final negotiations to select the eventual winner in this "mother of all defence deals".

Rafale

Under the project, 18 jets will be bought off-the-shelf, while 108 will be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd after transfer of technology.

IAF, on its part, had submitted its flight evaluation trials and staff evaluation reports to MoD a year ago after evaluating the six fighters on as many as 643 technical attributes during the gruelling field trials.

This will be the first time that India will take into account "life-cycle costs" -- the cost of operating the fighters over a 40-year period, with 6,000 hours of flying -- rather than just pitching for the lowest bidder in a defence contract.

The contract also specifies 50% offsets, under which the selected foreign vendor will be required to plough half of the contract forex value back into India.

IAF is keen to induct the first lot of these 126 fighters by 2014 to retain its combat edge. It is left with just 32 fighter squadrons (each has 12 to 18 jets) at present, down from the "sanctioned" strength of 39.5 squadrons. This when Pakistan is getting new American F-16s and Chinese fighters, while China assiduously builds new airbases in Tibet and south China.

MoD's new list of questions delays MMRCA deal

The Indian Air Force’s seven-year effort to buy 126 medium multi-role combat planes — one of the single-largest military orders in the world — is for now mired in a flurry of questions that the defence ministry has asked the competing vendors.

Dassault Rafale	Boeing F-18 Super Hornet	Eurofighter Typhoon	SAAB Gripen	Lockheed Martin's F-16

This could result in a delay in signing the contract even after the IAF has completed evaluating and ranking the six aircraft in the competition, a senior air headquarters source has said.

Last month, at the Aero India exhibition in Bangalore, Air Chief Marshal Pradeep Vasant Naik said: “The contract negotiation committee (CNC) is likely to start in a week or two and the contract is likely to be signed by September.”

Then on March 10 he said: “The cost negotiation for MMRCA will begin by the end of this month. I expect the contract to be signed before I retire from service in July this year.” But today, on the last day of the current financial year, the air headquarters officer said there was no intimation from the Defense Acquisitions Council (DAC) on the choice of the aircraft.

Defense minister A.K. Antony insists that the acquisition of the aircraft be transparent and comply with the Defense Procurement Policy (DPP). The DPP allows for both — the formation of a CNC or the selection of major procurements “for strategic considerations” without the lengthier process of bargaining over the price.

Eight global powers are backing their respective companies in the high-stakes game to win the Indian Air Force order that looks set to top $ 12 billion.

The US is supporting Lockheed Martin and Boeing with the F-16IN Super Viper and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet; the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain are backing the Eurofighter Typhoon; France has pitched Dassault Aviation’s Rafale; Sweden, the Saab Gripen and Russia the RAC MiG 35.

When Naik said in Bangalore that he expected the contract to be signed by September, he qualified it by adding that “dissatisfied vendors put a spoke in the wheel” — meaning that a losing contender may manipulate allegations that would lead to long-winded investigations and further hold-ups.

This is worrisome for the IAF because its fighter fleet is being steadily depleted.

The IAF has an “authorised” strength of 42 fighter squadrons. Unofficial sources say that it is making do with just 30 now and in three years that could come down to 27, blunting its numerical superiority over Pakistan’s (and considerably less than that of China’s).

The IAF completed the flight evaluation trials by a crack team of test pilots in Bangalore, Jaisalmer and Leh and the weapons’ firing trials in the manufacturers’ choice of ranges last year. It submitted its report and evaluation of the aircraft on nearly 600 counts in July.

The IAF officer said that the process required the flight evaluation trial (FET) report to be examined at first and then a study of the commercial, offset (re-investment) and transfer of technology offers. The ‘offset’ requirement for the contract lays down that the vendor must source and/or plough-back 50 per cent of the value of the order (of more than Rs 42,000 crore) from Indian companies.

The commercial bids are due to expire at the end of April this year. If a choice is not made by then, the bids will have to be re-submitted and the vendors will have to be asked to keep it valid for another year till April 2012.

The tender requires that deliveries of 18 of the 126 aircraft be made in “flyaway” condition. The balance 106 are to be manufactured under license and transfer of technology in India, inevitably with the defence public sector Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in 36 to 48 months from the signing of the contract.

The Requests for Information (RFI) for the aircraft were first sent out in 2004.

Already, IAF headquarters has noted with concern, there have been disconcerting events that threaten the process of the procurement. In December, a file on the “offsets” proposal went missing till it was found on a South Delhi street.

Last month, the country manager of one of the possible vendors, Dassault Aviation (Rafale), was suspected of illegal liaisoning with an IAF officer in Bangalore.

The defence minister himself is uncomfortable with US Ambassador Timothy Roemer’s statement that the India-US strategic partnership hinged largely on an American company winning the contract. And a UK audit report has found that there is a shortage of spares that limits flying time of pilots on the Eurofighter Typhoon.

IAF sources say that while prudence demands that the decision be a studied one, they worry that the longer the process, the more there could be controversies even as the fighter fleet gets depleted.

IAF refuses last minute offers from MMRCA contenders

Indian Air Force as quoted by PTI says that it will not accept last minute offers from Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contenders. IAF says that it has evaluated the bids as per the initial offers and last minute proposals like upgrade with more powerfull engines etc is unacceptable.

There are 6 contenders for the 10 billion dollar plus MMRCA tender. Lockheed Martin with F-16 IN, Boeing with F/A-18 E/F, Dassault Aviation with Rafale, Saab with Gripen, Rosoboronexport with MiG 35 and EADS with Eurofighter Typhoon are vying the 126 plane contract.

The IAF chief Air Chief Marshal PV Naik had said that the price negotiations are to begin by the end of this month. A price negotiation committe is being set up for the same.

The contract is important for all the six contenders, as defence budgets in their own countries have shrunk. While Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale and SAAB need to win this tender in order to survive, the order also represents a new lease of life for US contenders. The US has produced more than a 1000 of F-16 and F-18 aircrafts, but, this order represent almost 5% to 10% of their total production and that too before they close their lines.