China Protecting Terrorists From Security Council And USA: Wiki

It is a well known fact that China is in hand-glove with Pakistan in de-stabilizing India. But the hidden agenda of China is not limited only to India but it targets USA too.Most of the terrorist operating in Kashmir have links with Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda too, thus by shielding these individual China is not only fulfilling its strategy to harass India but it damages US war efforts too.

China uses the excuse of India not providing enough evidence against terrorist to block any UN sanctions against these guys. Five nations have the veto power in UN of which China is one, thus China can use its veto to keep these terrorist safe and free to attack India as well as USA.

According to leaked diplomatic cables of the US embassy in Beijing, from June 25, 2009, to January 20, 2010, the United States desperately tried to influence China to lift the technical hold, but failed even after it provided enough evidence to prosecute these militants in any country.

The cables quoted a Chinese official, as saying that China “is very serious” about its commitments to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, but without adequate information on “these three individuals”, it would not lift the hold. In other words unless China has no other alternative or pushed against the wall it will support Taliban movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The militants whom India wanted to be listed as ‘terrorist’ include Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Abdur Rehman Makki and Azam Cheema of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Chinese official Shen Yinyin was quoted in an August 21, 2009 cable, as telling the political officer of the US embassy that India had not provided sufficient information about Azhar, Makki and Azam Cheema, to merit their listing as terrorists.

According to another cable obtained by Dawn through whistle-blower website WikiLeaks, the US State Department viewed China as acting at the behest of Pakistan in holding the designations. You do not require a PhD degree to understand that. But what the US fails top realize that though this policy is India centric but has ramifications for the US Army in Afghanistan too.

China was one of the countries which condemned the US Abbotabad Raid to kill Osama Bin Laden. Even though most of the Arab nations and the world at large was happy to see Osama dead. Thus China has made it a policy to damage USA as much as it could in Afghanistan making them beat a hasty retreat. With Afghan nation not ready to shoulder security related responsibility it will be easy for China to move in as the honest trader to capture the economy and its ally Pakistan to move in with the help of its proxies to control Afghanistan. Then China can easily exploit the natural resources of Afghanistan for its own purpose while Afghanistan provides inexpensive slave labor and a market for cheap goods from China.

Pakistan Army Terrified Of Indian Armys COLD START Doctrine

As it was pointed out before on this site that the "cold start" doctrine of Indian Army has given cold sweats to Pakistani Army and to counter that they have turned to short range tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistani army was desperate to stop the Indian Army which was impossible for it to do, in case of a sudden attack. Specially after the Mumbai attack.

Funny part of all this is they even blackmailed Usa and India that Pakistan will not co-operate with the investigation unless India Army stops aggressive movement in Punjab,Rajasthan and Kashmir. On one hand they perpetuate the worst crime of this century and when squeezed play the damsel in distress card.

WikiLeaks Cables - Indian PM Manmohan Singh meets US Under Secretary Burns

More revelations as to how even PM Manmohan Singh was not sure about Amna Ki Asha yet he took a risk. Strange he is ready to gamble with India's future as if it is a personal property of Congress. Did he ever try to build a consensus or ask the India public what do they want. All this happened after he had won the election, that is without informing the people of India about his real intentions.
Was the opposition kept out of the loop too , was it some kind of secret deal....

Document dated 29/06/2009 from US embassy in India


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001209
SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019
TAGS: PREL, PARM, MASS, PTER, ENRG, PK, IN
SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY BURNS MEETS INDIAN PRIME MINISTER SINGH
Classified By: Charge d'affaires Peter Burleigh. Reasons: 1.4(B, D).


1. (C) Summary: In a June 11 meeting, Prime Minister Singh assured Under Secretary Burns of his strong personal commitment to strengthening further India's ties to the United States. Singh welcomed the development of a road map that would provide structure to the strategic partnership and produce results. On Pakistan, Singh asserted that India was willing to engage with Pakistan, but must have assurances from the Pakistani government that its territory will not be used to plan and launch terror attacks against India. He was skeptical that the Pakistani military establishment had given up thinking of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba as strategic assets. Singh appreciated enhanced counterterrorism cooperation following the Mumbai attacks. Burns and Singh agreed that defense, technology, and education were all areas where ties could be expanded. End 


Summary.


2. (C) In a forty-minute meeting on June 11, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Under Secretary Burns discussed renewed progress in the bilateral relationship, bolstering defense ties, implementing the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear agreement, Indian aid to Afghan reconstruction and the political situation in Pakistan. National Security Advisor Narayanan,Foreign Secretary Menon and Ambassador to the United States Meera Shankar also attended the meeting. The Under Secretary was accompanied by Charge Burleigh and Assistant Secretary Blake.


Boosting a Strong Relationship
------------------------------


3. (C) PM Singh stressed his personal commitment to building on past progress to strengthen further relations with the U.S. Noting that his government had a strong
mandate from the Indian people in the May parliamentary elections, Singh looked forward to Secretary Clinton's upcoming visit to India and the development of a road map that would boost ties. Singh flagged security and defense relations, and counterterrorism ties as particularly important. Singh said that the U.S.-India relationship drew support from the goodwill of many Indians whose relatives
were living and working in the United States. He appreciated his meeting with the President in April on the margins of the G-20 and extended again his personal invitation to the
President and his family to visit India.


4. (C) U/S Burns agreed that the relationship held great promise. Noting the Prime Minister's personal leadership in the previous Parliament in ensuring passage of the Civil Nuclear Agreement, Burns noted that education, science and technology were also areas where the U.S. and India could partner together. He stressed that the U.S.saw its relationship with India as a pillar in addressing global challenges. Burns conveyed the President's regards and passed the Prime Minister a letter from the President.


Pakistan
--------
5. (C) Asked by Burns for his assessment of the Pakistani leadership, Singh demurred, pointing out that the U.S. had much closer contact with both the civilian and military establishment in Pakistan. Singh said India was worried about the growing influence of the Taliban in Pakistan. He wanted reassurances that the Pakistani military had decided to deal with the Taliban menace effectively. Singh observed
there was a "duality of thought processes" in Pakistan and particularly in the military. There were some who clearly regarded the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) as strategic assets. Singh said India hoped there had been a change of heart in Pakistan over time. He offered that if Pakistan truly needed to shift military forces from its eastern to western borders to fight insurgents, then Islamabad would face no threat from India.


6. (C) Singh noted that India saw the release of LeT leader Hafiz Saeed from Pakistani detention as "a confusing signal." Nevertheless, Singh said, India was committed to meeting Pakistan "more than halfway" and was not afraid of talks that could tackle the range of outstanding issues. However, he cautioned, if he as Prime Minister was talking peace while Pakistani territory was being used to plan and conduct terror 


NEW DELHI 00001209 002 OF 002


attacks against India, then "he would look ridiculous" in front of the Indian people. Singh said India sought assurances from Pakistan like those President Musharraf had
offered; Pakistan could not be a base for terror directed against India. While in a democracy there is a need to use imagination to move forward, Singh said,India also could not forget the past. Responding to Burns' observation of the progress India and Pakistan had made up to 2007 in quiet discussions, Singh asserted that India was willing to engage with Pakistan, but the Pakistan government had an obligation to stop the planning and launching of terror attacks from its territory.


Counterterrorism Cooperation
----------------------------


7. (S) PM Singh was appreciative of the enhanced counterterrorism cooperation that had occurred following the November 26 Mumbai attacks. He singled out intelligence
sharing as benefiting India, but noted that this information demonstrated that the threat of terror attacks after Mumbai was far from over and "that he did not sleep well at night" knowing about these threats.


Civil Nuclear and Defense Ties Highlighted
------------------------------------------


8. (C) Responding to the Prime Minister's request, Burns explained that the roadmap would lay out a renewed strategic partnership that would be aimed at producing practical results. He noted that there was follow-up needed on the
Civil Nuclear Agreement and that the U.S. hoped to move past barriers to defense cooperation. Singh suggested that the U.S. defense industry would find tremendous opportunities in working in collaboration with India to help it modernize its armed forces. India's concerns about maintaining its sovereignty in defense agreements were not merely an issue of semantics, but Singh was confident these issues could be ironed out. Burns expressed confidence that there could be agreement on end use monitoring in defense sales. He also noted that technological cooperation in areas like clean
energy held great promise.


Afghanistan Reconstruction
--------------------------


9. (C) PM Singh spelled out India's goals for Afghanistan:
India wanted a peaceful, prosperous, stable and moderate Islamic state in Afghanistan. India's USD 1.2 billion in assistance was a  contribution to the education,health and well-being of the Afghan people. While India was not able to contribute troops in Afghanistan, it fully supported efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. Singh hoped the international community understood that this would be a long-term process and that all those working in Afghanistan "would stay the course." Burns assured Singh that the U.S. had a long-term strategy and was committed to working for a stable Afghanistan.


BURLEIGH

Pakistan Cable On Lack Of Evidence To Convict Top 26/11 Suspects

Dated 12/05/2009 from US Embassy In Pakistan (classified)


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001024


SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, PK
SUBJECT: MUMBAI PROSECUTION UPDATE: PAKISTAN LACKS EVIDENCE TO CONVICT TOP SUSPECTS


REF: ISLAMABAD 922


Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b), (d).


1. (C) Summary: On May 12, the Pakistani Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) granted an extension for filing the final charge sheet until May 23. While the FIA and prosecutors have been able to use the repeated extensions to gather more evidence,time is running out, and the prosecution does not/not have enough evidence to convict the top Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) suspects, Lakhvi, Zarrar Shah, and al Qama. If the FIA does not receive the necessary third-country evidence from the GOI (or the FBI after GOI approval), these three suspects will likely be acquitted and released. Repeated USG interventions at several levels with the GOI have not yielded any certified evidence being passed to the GOP. If the top LeT terrorists are released, India will certainly accuse Pakistan of a lack of good faith in prosecuting and of directly sponsoring terrorism against India. Washington agencies and New Delhi may wish to review what further steps can be taken with the Indian government.
End summary.


TRIAL TIMELINE
---------------


2. (C) The trial of the five Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) suspects arrested in connection with the Mumbai attacks, Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Hammad Ammen Sadiq, Mazhar Iqbal (aka al Qama), Abdul Wajid (aka Zarrar Shah), and Shahid Jamil Riaz will begin shortly, possibly as soon as the beginning of June. On April 29, the Pakistani Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) filed an interim charge sheet in a Rawalpindi Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC). The judge granted the FIA an extension to file its formal charge sheet until May 5 and then a further extension until May 12.


3. (C) On May 12, the ATC granted another extension until May 23, on which date the court will hear preliminary procedural issues, such as the FIA request for an in-camera trial. On May 23, the court may also request the final charge sheet. The FIA hopes that it will not need to file the charge sheet on this date, but the FIA will be prepared to submit it. The final charging document will lay out all evidence that the prosecutors intend to use during the case, and will outline the case against each suspect. Introducing additional evidence not found in the charge sheet once the trial begins is possible; however, it is difficult and the late introduction tends to impugn the veracity of the evidence. Ideally, the prosecution needs to have all its evidence on hand once the charge sheet is filed. On May 23, the FIA has told Emboffs that it will request a further extension, but the trial can begin as soon as a week after the final charge sheet is filed. Even with the requested extensions, the outcome of the hearing could still include the acquittal of Lakhvi, Shah, and al Qama.


NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE TO CONVICT TOP LET LEADERS
-----------------------------------------------


4. (C) As reported in reftel, the FIA investigation into the Mumbai attack has been diligently pursued and the FIA has developed a strong independent case against Sadiq and Riaz. However, the FIA does not/not have enough independent evidence to successfully prosecute the senior LeT leaders, Lakhvi, Shah, and al Qama. Unfortunately, due to political pressure, the FIA was put in the position of arresting and charging the three individuals before it had conducted a complete investigation or collected the proper evidence. Due to the nature of the Pakistani judicial system, the probability that sufficient independent evidence will be uncovered or developed against these three before the trial is small and they will most likely be acquitted due to a lack of evidence as early as May 23. Significantly, if the three LeT leaders are acquitted in the ATC, under Pakistani law they cannot be charged again in Pakistan for the Mumbai attacks.


5. (C) Important evidence that links Lakhvi, Shah, and al Qama to the Mumbai attacks remains in the hands of the GOI and the FBI. As previously reported, the FBI awaits GOI approval to pass the evidence it holds to the GOP. Crucial


ISLAMABAD 00001024 002 OF 003


voice recordings of the LeT controllers have not been given to the GOP by the GOI. These voice samples (or sworn testimony by suspects in Indian custody regarding the voice recordings) could link these top LeT leaders to the Mumbai attacks.


6. (C) A second key piece of evidence that links the conspiracy in Pakistan to the Mumbai attacks is a set of two pink aluminum Improvised Explosive Device (IED) boxes, one found in a Karachi training site and one used in the Mumbai attacks. The Pakistani box has been sent to the FBI for forensic analysis. The preliminary test conducted by the FBI laboratory in Quantico reported a positive result for RDX, an explosive used in the Mumbai attack. Investigators note the similarities between the two boxes; however, the connection can not be confirmed until the GOI gives the FBI samples of its box.


7. (C) The GOP has hired a distinguished private attorney Malik Noon to lead its prosecution. The FBI's National Security Law Branch has sent attorney Brian Schilling to help the GOP with evidentiary issues in its prosecution. Schilling will meet with Noon on May 14 to discuss introducing third-country evidence and other procedural hurdles.


STILL WAITING FOR INDIAN EVIDENCE
----------------------------------


8. (C) On May 5, DCM Feierstein contacted Charge Burleigh in New Delhi to request his help in urging the GOI to pass relevant evidence to the GOP. On May 6, Charge Burleigh met with Indian Foreign Secretary Menon and raised the evidentiary cooperation question. Menon replied that the GOI had already requested court permission to send all the documents requested by the GOP. Menon said the Indian judge would proceed at his own pace but that he thought the request was non-controversial and would be granted. Charge Burleigh noted the urgency of the court deadline, and Menon smiled and said he knew of that, but that it was not true that introducing additional evidence after that period (when the charge sheet is submitted) was unusual or difficult. Menon added, "we have the same system and we know how their courts work." Despite Menon's statement, Charge Burleigh pressed for urgent action, but received no firm commitment.


9. (C) The GOI has also repeatedly told the GOP that it has already passed all relevant evidence, however, none of the evidence passed to the GOP is judicially certified and thus is inadmissible. For example, the fingerprints of the Mumbai attackers passed to the FIA are blurry photocopies of the original fingerprints. These fingerprint photocopies are neither admissible in court nor can they be used to match fingerprints in Pakistani custody. Based on meetings with Indian Deputy High Commissioner Vohra in Islamabad and information from Legat New Delhi, a possible high-level GOI lack of understanding of evidentiary requirements may be influencing the GOI response to GOP requests.


10. (C) The most important items that the FIA or FBI still need (in judicially certified form) from the GOI:
-Certified copies of all evidence already passed to the GOP, including forensic analysis, fingerprints, and confession statements
-Full interrogation reports of Sabahuddin and Ansari, Indian conspirators in custody -Complete copies of the voice recording of the controllers and attackers during the incident
-Sample of Pink IED Box


11. (C) Comment: Pakistan's FIA has been diligent and competent in investigating and building a plausible case.
Post believes it is committed to a successful prosecution, however, because of political pressure and an expedited time frame the FIA does not have a viable case against the top LeT leadership in its custody. Repeated high-level intervention with the GOI has not yielded the passage of certified evidence to the GOP. As mentioned in reftel, connecting the LeT conspiracy in Pakistan to the attacks in Mumbai depends heavily on evidence that can only come from India. As the trial time nears, without new evidence, the court will be


ISLAMABAD 00001024 003 OF 003


forced to acquit and release Shah, Lakhvi, and al Qama.
End comment.


PATTERSON

Pakistan cable on possible Lashkar e-Taiba attacks against India

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 065183 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019 
TAGS: PGOV, PK 
SUBJECT: USG CONCERNED ABOUT POSSIBLE LASHKAR E-TAIBA ATTACK 

Classified By: PJONES for reason 1.4(b), (d). 

1. (U) This is an action request. 

2. (C/REL Pakistan) Embassy is instructed to underscore to senior Pakistani government officials the critical importance of Pakistani cooperation in preventing Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) attacks on India. There are credible reports of advanced LeT planning for attacks against India. An attack at this time -- especially from Pakistani territory -- would undermine progress for regional cooperation, divert resources from the military campaign in the west, and could hinder the USG's ability to provide Pakistan with military and economic assistance without restrictive conditions. The Embassy should also impress upon the GOP that Pakistan must implement and support UN Security Council designations of LeT-related entities as part of the GOP,s effort to disrupt and prevent further LeT attacks. 

3. (C/REL Pakistan) Post should draw on the following points 
in approaching Pakistani officials: 

-- As the November 2008 Mumbai attack has shown, LeT is capable of launching attacks that can directly undermine Pakistan,s relations with its neighbors and regional stability generally. LeT killed six Americans in the Mumbai attacks. LeT,s activities have directly harmed U.S. interests and have the ability to undermine U.S.-Pakistani relations. 

-- The new Indian Government has indicated its willingness to re-engage with Pakistan, but Pakistani progress in bringing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks to justice is critical to laying the foundation for improved relations with Delhi. Another Mumbai-style or major LeT attack on India, especially if launched from Pakistani soil, could close this historic opportunity and could risk a stronger Indian response than that which occurred after Mumbai. 

-- An attack at this time would also likely complicate the USG,s ability to provide Pakistan with military and economic assistance without restrictive conditions. 

-- The USG is aware of the tremendous efforts the Pakistan government is making in the west against certain extremist groups. We do not want those efforts to be disrupted by an LeT attack on another country,s territory. 
-- We strongly urge the government of Pakistan to take all steps it can to eliminate LeT permanently, while in the short term taking all possible action to disrupt LeT attack plans and other activities. 

-- We also are concerned over reports of LeT and Jaamat-u-Dawa (LeT,s political arm) activities in refugee camps in the NWFP. We welcome Pakistani Government efforts to uncover and shut down these operations in the camps, and we urge Pakistan to follow through on 1267-mandated asset freezes and travel restrictions against LeT and JUD and to stop these organizations, fundraising and recruiting efforts at the camps. 

-- We expect the GOP to act swiftly to implement sanctions against LeT/JUD, including by taking action against entities/individuals providing material support to the group (including any advertising or solicitation of funds for JUD). Effective implementation of sanctions should result in the cessation of JUDs "charitable" operations, including through any successor organizations. 


CLINTON

Wiki Leak cable on Kayani visit to Washington

Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
192895 2009-02-19 16:17:00 2011-05-04 06:16:07 SECRET Embassy Islamabad


S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 ISLAMABAD 000365


SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2018
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, EAID, PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL KAYANI'S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON


Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (S) Summary. Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq
Kayani's February 20-27 visit to Washington comes on the
heels of the government's loss of control over Swat,
continued Pakistani Army/Frontier Corps operations in the
tribal areas, and still-simmering Indo-Pak tensions in the
wake of the Mumbai attacks. We expect Kayani will request
increased intelligence sharing (real-time SIGINT and ISR),
help to modernize his helicopter fleet, increased support for
civilian law enforcement, and financial compensation for
Pakistanis displaced by combat. He likely will complain
about delays in Coalition Support Fund payments, suggest that
U.S. policy on strikes in the tribal areas be amended, and
request information about plans for a U.S. troop surge in
southern Afghanistan.


2. (C) We should recognize growing Pakistani casualties in
the fight against militants, praise Kayani's support for the
civilian democratic government in Islamabad, re-iterate the
long-term U.S. commitment to support Pakistan, and thank him
for agreeing to send his intelligence chief and director of
military operations to the Holbrooke/Riedel U.S.-Pakistan
strategic review meeting in Washington. We should also thank
Kayani for the GOP's effort to ensure that U.S./NATO
continues to deliver fuel and dry goods through Pakistan for
our forces in Afghanistan.


3. (C) But we need to lay down a clear marker that
Pakistan's Army/ISI must stop overt or tacit support for
militant proxies (Haqqani network, Commander Nazir,
Lashkar-e-Taiba). We should preface that conversation with
an agreement to open a new page in relations; Kayani, who was
ISI Chief from 2004-2007, does not want a reckoning with the
past. Given the GOP surrender of Swat to local taliban, we
need to press Kayani to commit his now reluctant Army to
retake the area after the "peace deal" inevitably fails.


4. (C) We should press for Pakistani prosecution of the
Mumbai suspects, encourage expanded USG training of Army and
Frontier Corps forces, raise the prospect of embedding U.S.
military observers/advisors with the Frontier Corps, support
a prioritized needs-based FMF request that builds COIN
capability, ask Kayani to explain how Pakistan plans to back
U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan, and probe for what
Indian action would allow him to redeploy troops from his
eastern front to support increased combat in the Pak-Afghan
border area. Suggested talking points and bio are included
at paras 28-30. End Summary.


Supporting Democratic Governance
--------------------------------


5. (C) The civilian government headed by Prime Minister
Yousaf Gilani, elected one year ago, is now stable.
President Zardari's elected position is politically secure
and Gilani has a majority in parliament. The Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) and its coalition allies rule in three
of the four provinces and effectively control all three
branches of federal government. Opposition leader Nawaz
Sharif is by far the most popular politician in Pakistan
(with an 83% approval rating compared to Zardari's 20% in the
latest IRI poll), but he does not have the votes to bring
down the government.


6. (C) Zardari is cementing leadership alliances so he can
avoid another election until he receives international
assistance to address food and fuel inflation, electricity
blackouts and high unemployment. Pakistan has met its
first-quarter targets under a $6.7 billion IMF Standby
Agreement but the economy remains too weak to support the
Pakistani military's appetite for expensive weapons systems
(particular F-16s).


7. (C) President Zardari and Kayani are the key
decision-makers in Pakistan; they have developed a respectful
if not entirely trusting working relationship. Kayani has
gone out of his way to publicly defer to Zardari because he
needs political support to wage successful military


ISLAMABAD 00000365 002 OF 006




operations. After eight years of military rule under
Musharraf, Zardari is re-shaping civilian-military relations
in the shadow of Pakistan's history of repeated military
coups. It is in USG interests for the Zardari/Gilani
government to complete its full five-year term, and we should
praise Kayani's efforts to support civilian democracy.


8. (C) Kayani may advocate for pending legislation
(Kerry-Lugar) in the U.S. Congress to triple non-military
assistance to Pakistan and robust USG support for an
IMF/World Bank Donors' Conference to provide $4 billion in
social safety net programs to compensate for IMF-imposed
budget cuts. We anticipate that Special Representative
Holbrooke will attend a Donors' Conference in April. Kayani
may request additional U.S. support for civilian law
enforcement; in addition to the over $40 million of equipment
and training delivered to the Frontier Corps, we are
providing $15 million in additional equipment for the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) police and are working to
re-program another $55 million in FY2009. There is a FY2009
supplemental request pending for another $95 million for the
police.
9. (C) Kayani will request cash to assist more than 300,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs) who have fled fighting in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Swat,
NWFP. Through USAID, State/PRM and DOD, we already have
provided over $10 million in assistance and are preparing to
respond to new UNHCR/ICRC/World Food Program appeals for
Pakistan. Of particular interest will be U.S. plans to
continue/expand the delivery of $2 million in (CERP-like)
assistance from DOD through the Frontier Corps to IDPs in
support of Kayani's counter-insurgency strategy.


10. (C) Security concerns are limiting our ability to
operate, but today USAID contractors are building schools and
wells, hiring workers for short-term jobs, training teachers
and increasing the capacity of the FATA Secretariat to
deliver services that demonstrate the writ of government in
FATA.


The Big Strategic Questions
---------------------------


11. (S) Zardari and Gilani agree that Pakistan's biggest
threat comes from a growing militant insurgency on the
Pak-Afghan border. The military and ISI have not yet made
that leap; they still view India as their principle threat
and Afghanistan as strategic depth in a possible conflict
with India. They continue to provide overt or tacit support
for proxy forces (including the Haqqani group, Commander
Nazir, Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba) as a foreign
policy tool.


12. (S) The single biggest message Kayani should hear in
Washington is that this support must end. It is now
counterproductive to Pakistan's own interests and directly
conflicts with USG objectives in Afghanistan--where Haqqani
is killing American soldiers and Afghan civilians--and the
region--where Mumbai exposed the fruits of previous ISI
policy to create Lashkar-e-Taiba and still threatens
potential conflict between nuclear powers.


13. (S) Kayani will want to hear that the U.S. has turned
the page on past ISI operations (he was ISI chief from
2004-2007). We should ask for his views on what political
end state in Afghanistan would convince him to end proxy
support for militants and probe for what would be required by
India to allow him to redeploy forces from the Indian border
for the fight in FATA. The reality is that, without a
redeployment, he does not have the forces (however poorly
trained) to combat the insurgency in FATA.


Pakistani Will. . . .
---------------------


14. (C) The good news is that the Army/Frontier Corps are
engaged in combat in Bajaur and Mohmand, FATA. Zardari is
committed to the fight; he knows that Osama bin Laden has
publicly targeted Pakistan and admits "the militants are


ISLAMABAD 00000365 003 OF 006




after me and my job." The bad news is that the militants
increasingly are setting the agenda.


15. (C) The government's anti-terrorism strategy is based
on "dialogue, deterrence and development;" however, it lacks
the military capacity to deter militants and the financial
resources to develop the FATA and NWFP. Its historic
fallback has been to play for time by conducting negotiations
with militants, a disastrous tactic that only has made the
extremists stronger. The government insists it will
negotiate with tribal leaders but not with militants.


16. (C) However, in the latest agreement in Swat (once a
tourist resort approximately 90 miles from Islamabad), the
provincial government agreed to negotiate for peace in
exchange for imposition of Shari'a law with the Taliban.
This was recognition of de-facto Taliban control, which
produced beheadings, closure of girls' schools, a growing
exodus of terrified citizens, and the desertion of outgunned
and outmanned police. Ham-handed military tactics, which
included indiscriminate artillery bombardment, have further
alienated a population that simply wants the fighting to end.
Under international pressure, Zardari has not yet signed off
on the deal pending assurances it really will deliver peace;
a similar negotiation in 2008 failed.


17. (C) Kayani, who supported the Swat deal, will argue
that he does not have the forces to battle on multiple
fronts, so he is picking his battles and negotiating to
preserve later options. We should push back hard, noting that
it will be difficult for international donors to support a
government that is not prepared to go all-out to defend its
own territory.


. . .vs Capability
------------------


18. (S) Now absorbing combat losses against formidable
militants, Pakistan's Frontier Corps (FC) and military
finally have begun to accept more USG training and assistance
in support of counter-insurgency (COIN). Kayani will
appreciate U.S. recognition of the casualties his men have
suffered, and this is an opening we should exploit to press
for expanded FC and special forces (SSG) training. Kayani
remains leery of too large a USG military footprint in
Pakistan, but to win he must be able to fight without
creating the level of civilian casualties his forces' blind
artillery and F-16 bombardments are now producing. We are
responding to Pakistan Air Force requests for Close Air
Support training to improve the precision of F-16s they are
using in FATA. We should probe for the possible introduction
of U.S. military observers/advisors to improve the COIN
capability of this 1940's force.


19. (S) Kayani will repeat his requests for increased
intelligence sharing, notably SIGINT, in support of ongoing
military operations in FATA. Pakistan has agreed to build
additional tripartite Border Coordination Centers (BCCs), and
this month we will expand real-time tactical/target-focused
intelligence sharing through the Torkham BCC. We continue to
work on delivering Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) aerial capability (two B350-ERs) that
Kayani has raised with all his high-level visitors.


20. (C) The Bush administration's commitment to provide
Pakistan with $300 million annually in FMF expires in 2009,
and we need to come to agreement with Pakistan on how to
restructure its FMF program to meet its long-term COIN needs.
The Pakistan military has requested $1B per year for five
years (FY10-14) in FMF.


21. (C) Kayani may request additional U.S. support for
Pakistan's F-16 program, the flagship symbol of post-9/11
re-engagement. We are about to send to Congress notification
for an additional $142 million in FMF support for one part of
this complex program. But we do not believe Pakistan can
afford to complete a $2 billion plus program to buy 18 new
F-16s, upgrade 35 older aircraft, upgrade a new base, and
fund a munitions package. Given the funding and production


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line implications of either bailing out the GOP or canceling
the program, U.S. agencies are reviewing our options.


22. (C) We could not agree more with Kayani on the need to
modernize Pakistan's helicopter fleet; on any given day, they
have perhaps 2-3 attack helos flying in support of COIN
operations. We now are delivering spare parts for their
Cobra and Bell 412s, overhauling and upgrading their MI-17s,
and assessing ways to improve overall helicopter maintenance.


U.S. Strikes
------------


23. (S) As recent media reports indicate, the U.S. has
eliminated 10 of the top 20 al-Qaida operatives in Pakistan
over the last year. However, the strikes have put increasing
political pressure on the Pakistani government, which has
struggled to explain why it is allowing an ally to violate
its sovereignty. The GOP so far has denied recent media
reports alleging that the U.S. is launching the strikes from
bases in Pakistan. Kayani knows full well that the strikes
have been precise (creating few civilian casualties) and
targeted primarily at foreign fighters in the Waziristans.
He will argue, however, that they undermine his campaign
plan, which is to keep the Waziristans quiet until the Army
is capable of attacking Baitullah Mehsud and other militants
entrenched there. In recent meetings with Special
Representative Holbrooke, a variety of Pakistani
interlocutors (and now the press) suggested that the U.S.
work jointly with Pakistan and target Mehsud or other
militants who are killing Pakistanis.


Afghanistan
-----------


24. (C) Pakistan-NATO/Afghan cooperation and coordination
across the border has improved dramatically in recent months.
This includes exchanges of tactical intelligence that allows
NATO forces to block passes in support of Pakistani
operations and has helped lower attacks on U.S./NATO forces.
In recent meetings with ISAF Commander McKiernan, Kayani
raised concern about the effect of a U.S. troop build-up in
southern Afghanistan, which could push militants and refugees
across the border into Balochistan and prompt an influx of
foreign fighters. Pakistan currently has only one Army
brigade and perhaps 15 Frontier Corps wings stationed along
the vast and largely unpopulated Pak-Afghan border in
Balochistan.


25. (C) Following embarrassing militant attacks on
U.S./NATO convoys last year, Pakistan has made efforts to
secure Khyber Agency/Torkham Gate, through which U.S./NATO
trucks deliver 30% of the fuel and 80% of the dry goods for
our forces in Afghanistan. The troop surge will require us
to send additional supplies through the Chaman (Balochistan)
border crossing in Afghanistan; CENTCOM is now evaluating
ways to improve delivery of supplies through Pakistan.


India
-----


26. (C) Indo-Pak tensions are still simmering, but to avoid
a potential Indian military strike, the GOP needs to continue
to show progress on prosecuting those Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
operatives responsible for the Mumbai attacks. India has
welcomed the GOP decision to file formal charges against the
key masterminds of Mumbai; Islamabad now awaits an Indian
response to requests for additional information (forensics,
ballistics reports, etc) from New Delhi to support
prosecution.


Nukes
-----


27. (S) Although he has remained silent on the subject,
Kayani does not support Zardari's statement last year to the
Indian press that Pakistan would adopt a "no first use"
policy on nuclear weapons. Despite increasing financial
constraints, we believe that the military is proceeding with


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an expansion of both its growing strategic weapons and
missile programs. Pakistan's strategic assets are under the
control of the secular military, which has implemented
extensive physical, personnel and command and control
safeguards. Our major concern has not been that an Islamic
militant could steal an entire weapon but rather the chance
someone working in GOP facilities could gradually smuggle
enough fissile material out to eventually make a weapon and
the vulnerability of weapons in transit. Despite a court
decision to "free" nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan, the GOP
continues to assure us he remains under significant travel
and media restrictions.


28. (S/Rel Pak) Suggested Talking Points:


-- (S/Rel Pak) What is in the past is behind us. What we
seek going forward is an all-encompassing bilateral
relationship based on what we can accomplish for the future.
We recognize your sacrifices and are well-aware of the
trust-deficit that exists on each side. We must both work to
overcome it.


--(C/Rel Pak) We appreciate your efforts to support stable
civilian democracy in Pakistan and are working to provide a
democracy dividend that improves both economic conditions and
the law and order situation.


-- (S/Rel Pak) We must succeed in Afghanistan. What is your
vision for what constitutes an acceptable outcome?


-- (S/Rel Pak) We want more Pakistani forces deployed to the
western border to fight the militants. What conditions are
necessary for you to reposition forces from the eastern to
the western border?


-- (S/Rel Pak) It is time to cut your ties to extremist
groups/proxy forces and urge the permanent severing of ties.
Such ties hinder trust and our ability to move forward
together.


-- (S/Rel Pak) Our security relationship must move beyond
the provision of equipment, and we seek opportunities to
expand training throughout the military.


-- (S/Rel Pak) Our ability to deliver sustained security
assistance also depends on the Administration securing
Congressional approval. Congress is likely to prioritize
assistance to counterinsurgency-related equipment and
training, as well as align its support with Pakistani
performance in the field.


-- (S/Rel Pak) Strikes in the FATA are succeeding in
eliminating the enemy senior leadership and collateral damage
has been minimal. We are working to provide you with tactical
battlefield intelligence to support your operations in FATA.


Bio Notes
---------


29. (U) General Ashfaq Kayani was born in Punjab in 1952,
grew up in a working-class family and is the son of a former
junior officer. He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army
after graduating from the Pakistan Military Academy in 1971.
His long career has included command at every level from
Company to Corps. He has served in key staff positions, to
include Military Assistant to the Prime Minister under
Benazir Bhutto from 1988-1990, Director General of Military
Operations (DGMO), 2000-2003, Director General, Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) from 2004-2007, and Vice Chief of
Army Staff in 2007. In November 2007, he became Chief of
Army Staff (COAS). He is the only officer ever to have served
as both DG-ISI and COAS. His term as DGMO coincided with the
intense military standoff with India of 2001-2002.


30. (C) C) In interactions with post, Kayani is often
direct, frank, and thoughtful. He has fond memories of his
IMET training at Fort Leavenworth and values his personal
relationships, particularly with U.S. military leaders.
Kayani is married and the father of two children, a son and a


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daughter. An avid golfer, he is President of the Pakistan
Golf Association. He smokes heavily and can be difficult to
understand as he tends to mumble.


PATTERSON