Showing posts with label 26/11 attack. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 26/11 attack. Show all posts

Friday, 10 June 2011

Verdict in Rana case not a setback to India, says Govt


Government today said the verdict in the Tahawwur Rana case in a US court, holding the Pakistani-Canadian not guilty for the Mumbai attacks, is not a setback as India does not rely overtly on prosecution of terror suspects in other countries.

"I do not see it as a setback as our case (India) is still under investigation," Secretary, Internal Security in the Ministry of Home Affairs, U K Bansal told reporters here.

Bansal said, "Prosecution in India against Rana and his co-accused David Headley depends on our own investigations which is being done by Indian investigating agencies.

"In our handling of terrorism in India, we do not rely overtly on prosecution in other countries. We have to rely on our own strength," he said.

Bansal said government will go to the court against the 26/11 accused with its own investigation.

Friday, 27 May 2011

How Pakistan Planned For Carnage And Mayhem In Mumbai

Mumbai attack co-accused David Headley has said during his trial at the Chicago court that a Pakistan Navy man was present during discussions with his ISI handler Major Iqbal on landing sites and arrival of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists by sea.

Headley also said that he attended over 50 training sessions with the powerful Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, and that he always briefed Iqbal first during his visits to Pakistan. Iqbal was briefed at a Lahore safe-house, he said.

The 50-year-old Pakistani-American gave details of the Mumbai attack plot involving his Pakistani handlers while being cross-examined by the defence attorney Charles D Swift on the fourth day of the trial of Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani of Canadian origin and another co-accused in the case.

Headley said ISI provided him a special discourse in Lahore for carrying out surveillance ahead of the Mumbai carnage.

"ISI did provide me (espionage) training," he said, adding that he had attended 50 training sessions over a period of time.

Headley replied in the affirmative when asked by Swift if anyone from the Pakistan naval establishment was present during meetings with Iqbal on landing sites in Mumbai to carry out the attack.

"When discussing the landing site, someone from the Pakistan Navy was present - clean shaved, military bearing, hair cut."

Headley said his name was Abdur Rahman.

During questioning, Headley also said he did not know anyone in ISI above Major Iqbal.

He also said that the ISI provided him training on the streets and in a two-storey safe house in Lahore, near the airport.

Headley also told that court that when he met Major Iqbal in 2006, he expressed dissatisfaction at the military and espionage training that he had received from the LeT earlier.

Major Iqbal, who was identified by Headley as 'Chaudhery Khan', told him that the training received from LeT was "not very good" and was "very elementary", so he decided to give instructions to him.

The statements formed part of the testimony of Headley, who has pleaded guilty.

These disclosures, which further cements India's charges that elements of ISI were involved in the 26/11, is also corroborated by information given by federal prosecutors in the documents to the court, which have been unsealed.

Headley said he had taken videos of the Taj Hotel in Mumbai several times and also inside of a train station in CST.

Q) Video surveillance at railway station was an egress route (act of getting out of target area)
A) Yes

Q) That was Major Iqbal planning
A) Yes

Q) You were not detected?
A) Yes

Q) This is the landing site you identified
A) Yes

Q) What were you looking for?
A) Looking for something safe where we could not be detected.

Headley said he went to the Taj to video the area on numerous times and that he had stayed in the Taj on April 7, 2007 along with his second wife (from Morocco) with me.

He testified he used the occasion to video tape and take pictures and that his second wife was covered in a veil.

David Headley Trained By Lashkar And ISI

Dissatisfied with the military and espionage training received by Mumbai attacks accused David Coleman Headley from the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Pakistan's spy agency ISI gave him special coaching in surveillance tactics before 26/11.

The training was given by Major Iqbal, Headley's ISI handler, on the streets and in a two-storey safe house in Lahore near the airport, the 50-year-old said.

"ISI did provide me (espionage) training," Headley told a Chicago court as he was grilled by defence attorney Charles Swift who's trying to prove Headley's friend and co-accused, businessman Tahawwur Rana, was in the dark about the Lashkar operative's terror role.

Headley told the court that when he met Major Iqbal in 2006, he was told Lashkar's training was "very elementary" and "not very good". So Major Iqbal, who was identified by Headley as Chaudhery Khan, decided to personally coach him. It was a double-storey house with a small compound outside in a residential neighbourhood, Headley described.

In answer to repeated questions on Thursday, Headley said he did not know the full name of Major Iqbal, but was sure he was from the ISI. Although Headley never saw Major Iqbal in military uniform, he came to meet him several times in a military jeep and his subordinates had military designations, he said.

He was introduced as Major Iqbal to him.

Headley said he never went to the ISI headquarters and added that he was introduced to Major Iqbal by military personnel.

The disclosures are part of the testimony of Headley, who has pleaded guilty, and cements India's charges that elements of ISI were involved in the 26/11 attack. Delhi's fears are being corroborated by information given by federal prosecutors in the documents to the court, which have been unsealed.

The ISI and Major Iqbal were particularly motivated by the fact that he was born in the US. As an American national, he would be able to conceal his real identity in India, they felt.

"They (ISI and Major Iqbal) wanted me to have a business so as to have the ability to have a long-term stay in India. In discussion with them I suggested it to take the help of Dr Rana's (Tahawwur Rana) business to get this objective," he said.

According to the new documents, Headley began attending terror training camps of the Lashkar in February 2002. By December 2003, Headley had attended five separate courses, and had been trained in, among other things, Lashkar's philosophy, the use of weapons and grenades, combat tactics, survival skills and counter-surveillance methods.

After completing several camps, Headley became acquainted with senior Lashkar member Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, who was responsible for Lashkar's military operations and one of the brains behind 26/11.

Tuesday, 24 May 2011

Conspiracy Theories Abound In Karachi

Attacks against Pakistan security forces are all too common, but the scale of Monday's operation marked it out as the most audacious since the killing of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden by U.S. forces early this month.

The questions and conspiracy theories about the well-executed attack on PNS Mehran have begun to circulate. But a look at existing patterns, threats and warning signs helps connect the dots.

Target

While other attacks have targeted military personnel, the PNS Mehran attack is different in that it directly targeted the P-3C Orion aircraft. “The attack has rendered the navy deaf and dumb,” said security analyst Ikram Sehgal. “The P-3C aircraft acts as the navy’s ears and eyes. There are three basic elements — anti-submarine warfare, radar capabilities and electronic intelligence.”

The Pakistan Taliban, which is allied with al Qaeda, said the attack was to avenge bin Laden's killing. At least 12 military personnel were killed and 14 wounded.

It was not clear how many of the militants were killed.

"If these people can just enter a military base like this, then how can any Pakistani feel safe?" asked Mazhar Iqbal, 28, engineering company administrator taking a lunch break in the shade outside the complex where a crowd had gathered on a patch of grass to watch journalists set up camp as much as anything.

He said he was from an insecure area of the southern city already infamous as a source of funding for militant groups.

"The government and the army are just corrupt. We need new leaders with a vision for Pakistan."

Karachi has a population of about 18 million people, a volatile mix of rival ethnic groups and political factions, who all to readily resort to violence to settle scores.

Sprawling along the sun-baked coast of the Arabian Sea, the city is also home to Pakistan's main port, financial markets and the central bank.

It is also a transit point for military and other supplies to Afghanistan for the U.S.- and NATO-led anti-insurgency effort there.

QUESTIONS

The navy base is ringed with a concrete wall with about five feet of barbed wire on top. An aircraft, armed with rockets, hangs on show on a stand outside.

Two white paramilitary ranger vehicles had taken up position outside the main gate, each with a machinegun on top and an officer wearing a black cap and camouflage.

There were about 30 to 40 journalists gathering outside, with seven satellite dishes attached to their trucks. Helicopters buzzed overhead and the main road outside was closed to traffic.

Moin Babar, 35, a technical engineer, said people were trying to understand how the militants made it inside.

"I heard that 15 went in through a sewer," he said.

Kamran Khalil, 48, a civil engineer, suggested, like many others, a conspiracy.

"How can this happen? It's taking them so long to resolve the issue. India or the CIA could have been behind this. They want to show that Pakistan forces are ineffective."

Many in Pakistan were furious with the U.S. operation to kill bin Laden without sharing any intelligence beforehand with Islamabad, which they saw as a severe breach of sovereignty.

"This is all a reaction to American policy in Pakistan," said Atif Ali, a 30-year-old construction worker, standing near one billboard advertising audio equipment in which a beautiful woman says "Let's play" and another advertising pizza.

WHY THE NAVY?

Pakistan’s armed forces have been under attack by militants for several years now, however the navy has rarely been targeted. In 2008, seven people were killed in a suicide attack at Lahore’s Naval War College. On December 1, 2009, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the naval headquarters in Islamabad.

On April 26, 2011, four people were killed and 26 were injured in twin bomb blasts on naval buses in Karachi. Two days later, six people were killed and seven injured in another attack on a bus carrying naval personnel near the Karsaz base. “These were soft targets,” says Sehgal. “But it should have been questioned as to why technicians, who were going to and from the naval base, were being targeted.”

While Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan claimed responsibility for the attack, Sehgal believes that the beneficiaries of Sunday’s attack are countries that have ‘had designs on Pakistan’, and that this had “India’s Research and Analysis Wing’s signature all over it”. He said it was “far fetched” to believe that the attack could be retribution for the Pakistan Navy’s role in Combined Task Force 151, an international anti-piracy fleet that was commanded by the Pakistan Navy earlier this year.

INTERNAL INVOLVEMENT

The security of Pakistan’s military bases has been in question for several years now. The attack on the military’s general headquarters in Rawalpindi in 2009 as well as frequent attacks on security check posts, bases and training centers is part of a pattern, both of infiltration of and radicalisation in the security forces, and the lack of adequate security measures.

A precedent for involvement by military personnel exists. Investigation into an assassination attempt on former president General (retd.) Pervez Musharraf found that the ammunition had been taken from a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) depot. Seven military officials — six of whom were from the air force — were convicted by a military court along with six civilians. According to a Dawn report in 2010, explosives used in the attacks on Karachi’s Abdullah Shah Ghazi shrine were ‘sophisticated military explosives’.

A US embassy cable from 2006, which was released this month by WikiLeaks, highlights radicalisation in the air force. The cable quotes then-Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations Air Vice Marshal Khalid Chaudhry as saying that the airmen, most of who came from rural villages, were being radicalised by extremist clerics.

The cable quotes Chaudhry as saying, “You can’t imagine what a hard time we have trying to get them to trim their beards.”

The cable also reveals that Chaudhry claimed “to receive monthly reports of acts of petty sabotage, which he interpreted as an effort by extremists among the enlisted ranks to prevent PAF aircraft from being deployed in support of security operations in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas along the Afghan border.”

Radicalisation in the security forces was highlighted earlier this year when Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer was assassinated by a member of the Elite Force squad in Islamabad on January 4. A Los Angeles Times report in February highlighted the case of Zahid Manzoor Bajwa, a Punjab police official who had access to intelligence reports and is believed to have passed them on to the Taliban.

The PNS Mehran attack would have also required significant surveillance, which militant organisations have been able to conduct in the past, given their success at attacking the military’s Rawalpindi headquarters and buildings belonging to the Inter-Services Intelligence, Federal Investigation Agency and the Crime Investigation Department.

In the early 2000s, al Qaeda operatives had reportedly surveyed Karachi’s ports in preparation for a planned attack on the Strait of Hormuz and other ports used by the US Navy, according to the files of Guantanamo Bay detainees published by WikiLeaks.

WESTERN REACTION

The Obama administration strongly condemned on Monday the terrorist attack on a naval base in Karachi but avoided getting involved in the media debate on the security of Pakistan`s nuclear weapons.

State Department spokesman Mark Toner noted that the attack underscored the need for continuing cooperation between the US and Pakistan in the war against terror despite differences over the May 2 raid on Osama bin Laden`s compound.

“We strongly condemn this terrorist attack and we`re committed to working with Pakistan… in a joint effort to combat this kind of violent extremism,” Mr Toner told a briefing in Washington.

“It just illustrates that Pakistan is under enormous pressure and threat from these kinds of groups. And they suffer… considerably from this kind of violent extremism,” he said.

The attack also “speaks to the ongoing need for close counter-terrorism cooperation, even or in spite of some of the questions raised by the Bin Laden raid,” he added.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague also noted that the “attack once again demonstrates the seriousness of the threat that Pakistan faces from domestic militancy and extremism.”

Like the US, Britain also offered to help Pakistan combat violent extremists responsible for this and other attacks in the country.

While officials were cautious in their reaction, media outlets across the globe linked the Karachi attack to the question of security of Pakistan`s nuclear arsenal.

“And what does it imply for security at other key installations, not least those associated with Pakistan`s nuclear deterrent?” asked BBC`s defence and diplomatic correspondent Jonathan Marcus.

The Washington Examiner newspaper adopted an alarmist approach, claiming that “the attack points out to the increasing radicalisation of the armed forces of Pakistan, as such an attack could not be planned and executed without some inside help from someone inside the Pakistani Navy”.

The newspaper warned that “if the terrorists can get hold of any IRBM and nuclear materials, a few Indian and Israeli cities, and a few thousand Nato soldiers in Afghanistan might go up in smoke.”

The attack “underscored the insurgents` ability to penetrate fortified security installations,” The Washington Post noted. It quoted several analysts as saying that “it was likely they were helped by people inside the base.”

The incident “dealt another embarrassing blow to a powerful military that has faced harsh domestic criticism over the US operation that killed Bin Laden,” the Post added.

“The Bin Laden raid also raised questions about the safety of Pakistan`s nuclear arsenal, and defence analysts said the Karachi assault renewed those doubts,” the Post added.

Monday, 9 May 2011

Serving Major Among 4 Pakistani Nationals Behind Mumbai Attacks

A suspected serving Pakistani Major, believed to be working with the ISI, is among four nationals of that country charged by the US with being alleged conspirators behind the 2008 Mumbai terror strikes.

The accused identified as 'Major Iqbal', was named along with Sajid Mir, Mazhar Iqbal and Abu Qahafa in a second superseding indictment filed by the federal prosecutors before a court in Chicago on April 25 last. Besides, the indictment mentioned an unnamed individual as "Lashkar Member D."

Indian investigators had named Major Iqbal along with another Pakistani Army officer Major Sameer Ali as the brain behind the Mumbai terror strikes and on the request of New Delhi, Interpol has issued a Red Corner Notice against them.

The dossier was handed over during the Indo-Pak Foreign Secretary-level talks on February 25, 2010 in New Delhi. The role of 'Major Iqbal' emerged in the interrogation by the FBI of US terror suspect David Headley, arrested in Chicago in October, 2009 in connection with the Mumbai attack.

The four men identified were previously mentioned but not named in the indictments that charged Pakistani-American David Headley and Pakistani-Canadian Tahawwur Rana in connection with the Mumbai attacks which killed 166 people, including six Americans.

An individual known as 'Major Iqbal' participated in planning and funding attacks carried out by LeT in Mumbai, federal prosecutors said.

According to the Indian dossier, Maj Iqbal was posted in Lahore from 2007 to 2008 and was handling Headley. He also handled all the surveillance videos sent by Headley.

The US federal prosecutor said that in July 2006, Major Iqbal provided to Headley approximately USD 25,000 to, among other purposes, establish and operate the Mumbai office of First World and pay for living expenses while Headley carried out his assignments for Lashkar.

In September 2006, February 2007, September 2007, April 2008 and July 2008, Headley travelled to Mumbai for extended periods for the purpose of conducting surveillance of possible targets of attacks by LeT, using his association with First World as cover for his travels.

Prior to Headley's departure for each of these trips, Mir and Major Iqbal along with others instructed Headley regarding locations where he was to conduct video surveillance in and around Mumbai, as well as other locations in India.

After each trip, Headley travelled to Pakistan, where he met Sajid Mir and Major Iqbal associated with Lashkar to report on the results of his surveillance, and provided them with photographs and videos from the surveillance, the US federal prosecutors said.

In July, Major Iqbal provided Headley another USD 1,500 to keep open the First World office in Mumbai, but approved closing that office in the future and opening a new business in Delhi, to be used as cover for future activities by him.

And soon after the Mumbai attacks, Major Iqbal advised Headley to avoid contact with him until further notice and to remove any incriminating materials from his home in Pakistan.

Sajid Mir was associated with LeT and supervised others linked with the outfit. He served as a "handler" for Headley, who has confessed to his involvement in Mumbai attacks, and others who were directed to carry out actions relating to planning, preparing for and carrying out the terrorist strikes on behalf of LeT.

Abu Qahafa was an associate with LeT who trained others in combat techniques for use in terrorist attacks, while Mazhar Iqbal and 'Lashkar Member D' were LeT commanders.

According to the indictment, Sajid Mir, Abu Qahafa and Mazhar Iqbal conspired with each other, Headley, 'Lashkar Member D' and others known and unknown to the grand jury, to deliver, place, discharge and detonate explosives and other lethal devices in, into and against places of public use, state and government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities in India.

Federal prosecutors alleged that in July and August 2008, Abu Qahafa and others were training a number of young men in Pakistan in various skills and tactics to be used in carrying out terrorist attacks in Mumbai, including combat tactics, room entry, hostage rescue, nautical training and swimming.

During the course of attacks in Mumbai, the attackers were in telephonic contact with defendants Sajid Mir, Abu Qahafa and Mazhar Iqbal, all of whom were then located in Pakistan, the federal prosecutors said. "More specifically, during the course of the attacks, the attackers were advised to, among other actions, kill hostages, set fire and throw grenades. Sajid Mir also sought to arrange the release of a hostage in exchange for the release of a captured attacker," the United States indictment alleged.