Chinese Troops Come 20 km Inside India. Is India Heading For 1962 Again

Are the chinese sending troops inside Indian territories at various places for probing our preparedness or lack of it. Are these troops part of  reconosaince mission of the larger invading force lying behind? These are some of the questions being asked by Indian public. Sadly though no answer is forthcoming from a Government which has been bogged down by corruption and nepotism. The opposition is completely fractured most of them are in the Governments pocket due to pending court cases and investigations. To top it all the Indian economy is in a free fall with the Central bank and the finance minister unable to do anything but to watch helplessly as the dream of a strong economy burns.

Under these circumstances China has chosen an opportune moment to turn the screws. Slowly it is becoming clear that there is a method to these seemingly unconnected events of Chinese troops coming inside Indian territories and camping for few days or weeks.Some people suggest that these are pressure tactics, while that may be true to some extent, it is belief of the author that these movements are part of a plan by the Chinese army to access the ground realities and map the geographical terrain behind the enemy lines. This move can only one thing that they are preparing for an assault which will carry their troops deep inside Indian territory. Instead of being surprised by some unforeseen circumstances the Chinese Generals are finding out what kind of situation their forces will face once inside India.

The second target may be to gauge the extent of Indian Armies preparedness to fight back.

Once all the pieces fall into place then the Chinese will make their move. One of the pieces being Pakistan, last time around they did not have support of the Pakistani's when they invaded but this time around they want to give their ally enough time for preparing a strong attack on the western borders of India.
In Jammu,Kashmir and Ladakh region Indian army will be caught in a pincer movement by the Chinese and the Pakistanis due to the connecting highway. Only sticking point for them is the Indian army posted at  Siachen.

Another problem could be Daulat Beg Oldie landing strip thus they have tried to push some men and find out the situation in that area too. The audacious intrusion into the Depsang Bulge, a table-top plateau, threatened to cut off India's access to some 750 sq km area in northern Ladakh: an area roughly half the size of Delhi. The face-off site was just about 35km south of the strategic Karakoram Pass, which is at the tri-junction of China-Pakistan-India borders, and overlooks the Siachen Glacier-Saltoro Ridge to the west and the Indian observation post in the Chumar sector to the east.

Indian Army and ITBP sends patrols to Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) and the Karakoram Pass. These patrols start from a place called Sasoma aound 80 km from Leh and then move on foot across the Saser and Depsang passes which are situated at a height of in excess of 16,000 feet. Thus loss of the Depsang Bulge would have cut off access to the areas north of the passes.

Indian Army Officers who were posted there say that this area is the only good staging area in the entire region from where Indian army may gather its men and machine to launch an offensive. This is because the bulge is the only wide open land in the region which is full of high jagged ridges of the Karakoram range in the north and Ladakh range in the south.

India armed forces hold the airstrip dear as it can be used for deploying mean and material in the region to cut off Karakoram highway between China and Pakistan. This was demonstrated by the 90 minute flight by IAF's C-130J aircraft from Hindon airbase.(Read details Times Of India News Site )

It is a well known fact that China has taken over the Gilgit-Baltistan area and now are the masters enslaving the local population. Exploiting their natural resources, putting the men and women of that area to work as their slaves basically like a horde of locust they are just devouring the land. To these new masters of Gilgit-Baltistan  Daulat Beg Oldie presents a real challenge. Which in turn will put their Gwadar and Karakoram highway connection plan in jeopardy too. China wants a port on Arabian sea and Gwadar is already leased out to them.

At times of emergency this air strip can be used to support Indian troops on the Siachen glacier too.

Now the latest provocation has come in the Arunanchal Pradesh border. It is the fervent hope of the author that Indian Government should put all its effort in war preparedness. This task should be taken up as a national emergency with all non-essential resources being directed toward that area.

Primarily all the environmental or political or monetary block should be removed for building roads in this area in a war footing. The mountain corp should be raised and activated as soon as possible. Though the navy mandarins have a counter view. They believe that India can cripple China and Pakistan completely if given opportunity.
Read The Counter point here




Unfortunately the situation in India is very similar to that of 1962, just like Nehru PM singh lives in a dream world of peace and panchasheel, refuses to look at the reality and has completely destroyed the war making capability of the nation as a whole. Example being mumbai attack which had the whole country up in arms but the pacifist did not let the army do anything thereby destroying the morale of the army. Next attack on the army was forced ouster and the mud slinging on the capable General called Gen(retd) V.K Singh. The same thing happened pre-1962 with Gen Thimaiyya and Nehru. Just like 1962 we have a good but incapable/unsuitable man as defense minister who is firmly a party man not a strategist. Thus the winds are blowing in favor of the Chinese once again.

The Cowards And The Heroes Of 1962

In our scriptures it is written वीर भोग्य वसुंधरा meaning the brave shall enjoy the pleasures of earth. I wonder how true that quote is ?? The following article shows the two faces of Indian Army during the 1962 war. At one end were the cowards known as "Kaul Boys" on the other were people like Shaitan Singh and Hoshiar Singh. On one end of the spectrum was fear, panic, mendacity and pure cowardice on the other end was cool calculated, pure unadulterated bravery.

The following article only just touches upon the stories of those men who died fighting for India and of those cowards who lived happily to be rich and prosperous, with their son's and daughters enjoying all the comforts of this world. Please read this article.

Feeble Resistance By The Indian Army Surprised The Chinese

China did not expect India to give in so easily in the 1962 war, so much so that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) overran Indian posts and reached deep into Tezpur in the plains of Assam, said Colonel (retd) Abhay

Indian Army Has No Stomach For A Fight With China

Bharat Karnard in one of his articles criticized the Indian Army as being completely clueless when it comes to China and he believes they have become more like the Government Of India weak in the mind and knees. Do you agree with his viewpoint or is the Indian Army trying to survive and do its best because Delhi is being ruled by weak dreaming incompetent impotent government. LEave your comment with your take on it.

Communist Media Obsessed With A Fictional Indian Monster

I just went to a very popular Chinese news site and .....

MAN THEY ARE OBSESSED WITH INDIA. People blame India for having panic attacks each time PLA moves a mule but you should see their reports and the conspiracy theories. Bollywood and Hollywood should start reading Chinese media for inspiration.


Some Gems That I Found


Japan And India with USA building a naval front against China to capture South China sea. Indian Navy is not concerned with Indian Ocean, they want a piece of Pacific too. Basically the writer claims that Japan and India form a wide defensive arc to block China because to enter Pacific they have to cross swords with Japan and to enter Indian Ocean and beyond they will have fight Indian Navy.


100,000 new Indian troops on the border in response to the peaceful "DEMILITARIZATION" of Tibet by China is basically a ploy by Indian Army to avenge 1962.Even though China has reduced most of its military presence to reach out to India a hand of friendship , India has responded by placing deadly cruise and ballistic missiles on Indo-China border.


India in illegal occupation of 100thousand square km of Chinese territory.


Long discourse on India Russia joint ventures and upcoming MMRCA deal.

Even before anybody knows about anything they have proclaimed that USA is going to give new F-35 to India and strengthen the Indian nuclear arsenal to counterbalance China.

Evil Dragons Breath Forces The Tiger To Respond

The massive Chinese buildup on the LAC has forced India to rethink its passive defensive policy and it is putting in place the second phase of military expansion along the China front, the government has given the go-ahead to deployment of Brahmos cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh. This will be India’s first offensive tactical missile deployment against China, sources said.

The three Brahmos missile regiments raised so far have been deployed in the western sector to counter the Pakistan threat. This will be the fourth regiment.

With a range of 290 km, these cruise missiles are being deployed to improve India’s military reach into the Tibet Autonomous Region and counter China’s elaborate missile deployment along the Sino-Indian border.

This, sources said, dovetails with India’s second expansion plan but is being fast-tracked because of urgency shown by the armed forces.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has also cleared the five-year expansion plan for which he had given the green signal earlier. The plan involves fresh accretion of 89,000 troops, with 400 officers.Linked to this, the CCS has decided to focus on security of Indian islands with the larger view of securing maritime routes criss-crossing the Indian Ocean.

Two Army brigades are also being lined up for the Andamans while a battalion-strength presence is being considered for Lakshadweep alongside the Navy. Air Force assets are also being increased in these island territories, the sources said.

In the next phase of Army expansion on the China border will include setting up a corps headquarter in Panagarh, West Bengal, along with two more divisions. An independent armoured brigade along with an artillery division will be part of the set-up.

Chinese state-controlled media has reacted angrily to the Indian military build-up along the LAC and, for the first time, China’s Chengdu Military Region has organized an Army-Air Force drill using live ammunition in an area 4,500 meters above sea level.

A Chinese language blog reported on October 21, under the heading “PLA’s Powerful Exercise: Lightning Hit Back at India’s Border Provocation,” that live ammunition war games were held soon after the Indian Army-Air Force Exercise along Rajasthan border. As China specialist D.S. Rajan noted writing for the South Asia Analysis Group, the blog suggested that MI-17 helicopters, F-10 fighter aircraft, 122-mm howitzers, two car- mounted anti-aircraft artillery groups and a large number of infantry fighting vehicles.

Also on October 21, a Chinese website published an extended article titled “India’s Border Blitz, Not to be Routine, with No Prior Notice to Beijing,” giving details of the Indian deployment along the LAC that is supposed to have used China’s strengthening of its troop deployment in Tibet as a “pretext.” It says that India has so far deployed 240 to 300 fighter aircraft, five mountain infantry divisions and one mechanized division in the eastern sector, including Arunachal Pradesh.

The piece took special note of reports in the Indian media of the Indian government supposedly sanctioning deployment of Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles in Arunachal Pradesh. It described the move as the first time India would be deploying offensive tactical missiles against China, thus signaling a marked shift in the Indian military strategy vis-à-vis China from “defensive” to “offensive

China could do Kargil on India

China could do a Kargil on India "to teach India a lesson", warned strategic affairs think-tank IDSA, adding it could be a "limited war".

The limited hostilities could be confined to a specific section of the border, limited in duration and amenable to a negotiated termination, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) said in its report.

Projecting conflict scenarios between the two Asian giants, a report titled 'A Consideration of Sino Indian Conflict' by Ali Ahmed said, "The lower end of the conflict at this level could be a Kargil-like situation. China's aim could be to teach India a lesson so as to influence India's rise before its capacity building underway acquires traction."

The report warned this "could be a limited war confined to a specific section of the border or LAC, limited in duration and amenable to a negotiated termination".

The Kargil hostilities were triggered by infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in 1999.

Ahmed warns at a higher level, China could indulge in a "territorial grab" by entering an area such as Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.

"At the next rung, it could be a more ambitious bid southwards up to its claim line. Lateral or horizontal expansion of conflict from one theatre to another is the next step, with the conflict engulfing one or more of the four possible theatres -- Ladakh, Central Sector, Sikkim and Arunachal," the report said.

The think-tank said in view of India becoming better prepared in future with its capability-development programmes, it could engage China's "hegemonic attention."

"Since India would be better prepared by then, China may instead wish to set India back now by a preventive war. This means current day preparedness is as essential as preparation for the future," it said.

How The Chinese Dragon Views Indian Military Doctrine

Author D S Rajan

Reports on India's revision of its defence doctrine to meet the challenges of a 'two front war' with Pakistan and China have of late received media focus. Pakistan has been prompt in its response, describing India's reported move as 'betraying hostile intent' and reflecting a 'hegemonic and jingoistic mindset'.

The People's Republic of China does not appear to have come out so far with any official reaction on the subject; interesting however is that the same theme of India's 'two front war', worded a bit differently as 'two front mobile warfare' has figured in an in-depth authoritative Chinese evaluation of India's defence strategy, done as early as November 2009; it raises a question whether or not Beijing already knew about India's reported revision of its defence strategy. This apart, it would be important to have a close look at what has been said in that analysis, for drawing meaningful conclusions. What follows is an attempt in that direction.

Titled 'Great Changes in India's Defence Strategy -- War objective shifts to giving China importance, while treating Pakistan as lightweight', the analysis contributed by Hao Ding, a researcher of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, published in the Party-affiliated Chinese language organ, China Youth Daily, on November 27, 2009, identifies following five shifts that have taken place in India's defence strategy:

'In terms of goals, India now aims at becoming a global military power in contrast to its earlier objective to acquire a regional military power status.' (The author's comments say in this connection that prior to end of the cold war, India followed an expansionist and hegemonic policy in South Asia, dismembered Pakistan, annexed Sikkim kingdom and dispatched troops to Sri Lanka and Maldives.

In the 21st century, India's national interests are expanding and accordingly, it is striving to protect its strategic superiority in the South Asian sub-continent as well as the Indian Ocean region. Simultaneously, India is actively projecting its power into the Asia-Pacific region, attempting to gradually become an Asia-Pacific power instead of being only a South Asian power. It is taking efforts to emerge as 'a major and positive geo-strategic player' in the Eurasian political chessboard. For this, India would require to work towards achieving strategic balance of power with countries outside like the US and China, operate beyond South Asia and Indian Ocean region and develop as a world military power.

'From the point of view of strategic guidelines, India has shifted to a line of 'active and aggressive defence', as a departure from the past position of 'passive defence'. (The analysis views that India has realised that in the 21st century, security threats to it are coming from 'three evil forces' -- the low intensity conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir which can trigger a large scale conflict, the risk of a nuclear confrontation among the two nations and terrorism in South Asia.

The Indian defence strategy has been revised in such circumstances; The 'active defence' concept has replaced the old line of passive defence, the basic 'regional deterrence' principle has been given a new meaning with 'punishment deterrence' concept taking place of the old principle of 'only deterrence'. India is stressing on taking initiatives so as to be able to conduct a hi-tech 'limited conventional war' against the enemy 'under conditions of nuclear deterrence'.

'Looking from the angle of war objectives, India is now laying emphasis to giving China importance while treating Pakistan as lightweight, as compared to the past equal emphasis to China and Pakistan.' The write-up says that in 21st century, India has done a reassessment of the military threats coming from Pakistan and China. It considers that in Pakistan, the internal situation has become unstable, economic development has slowed down, development of military faces restrictions and the overall national strength and military capabilities show a downward trend, in comparison to the situation in India. India believes that as such, there is a weakening of real threat to it from Pakistan.

On the other hand, in China, there is stable political situation, a fast developing economy, a continuously accelerating military modernisation drive and growing comprehensive national strength. India thinks that therefore, the potentials of 'China threat' to it are on the rise. It wants to correctly treat the dialectic relation between the changes that have occurred in military threats posed by Pakistan and China and prepare for all types of military struggles. Based on such reasoning, India has proposed the doctrine of 'two front mobile warfare'.

'In matters of strategic deployment, India has shifted to a strategy of stabilising the western front and strengthening the northern front as well as giving equal emphasis to land and sea warfare, in contrast to the earlier stress only on land warfare.'

The Chinese scholar elaborates this theme under three points (1) in recent years, India has carried out adjustments in its defence system to suit to the new needs. 'Stabilising the western front and strengthening the northern front' is a step in this direction. India has already made plans to dispatch additional forces- two mountain divisions- to the Sino-Indian border and deploy Su-30 fighter aircraft as well as missiles there in order to further strengthen its 'partial military superiority' vis-à-vis China, sufficient to fight a 'middle or small-scale partial border war under hi-tech conditions', (2) India is increasing its deployment of mobile warfare-capable troops. Some units, on 'double combat missions', can launch mobile operations in both China and Pakistan fronts and (3) India's past attention only to land warfare is now getting shifted in the direction of the Indian Ocean, creating a deployment position capable of paying importance to both land and sea. A part of Indian troops so far located in the rear of the borders is being diverted for coastal defence purposes and a new naval fleet has come up in the south to increase strength in respect of the Indian Ocean.

'India is making efforts to create long-range mobile operational strength and gain capacity to launch cross-combat missions.' The Chinese military expert comments that structural adjustment of the Indian military is in progress with focus on building Indian Navy and Air Force as well as rapid action troops, leading to building up of global combat capability of Indian armed forces. The expert cites in this connection the war doctrines of the Indian Army(2004), Indian Navy (2005) and Indian Air Force (2007).

The analysis above needs to be examined together with a very recent Chinese assessment. Given under the title 'Panoramic View of International Military Situation in 2009', the analysis contributed by Ma Kang, deputy director, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defence University, Liberation Army Daily, December 29 highlights the defence budget increases in the US, Russia and India. It points to India's '24 percent defence budget increase' in 2009 as compared to previous year as well as efforts to build an aircraft carrier of its own, launch of first home made submarine Arihant and goals set towards possessing 'three dimensional nuclear strategic capability.'

What stand out are the unmistakable adversarial tones with which the two highly placed Chinese experts have talked about India. Especially, the evaluation of Hao Ding runs contrary to the officially declared perceptions of India and China that each nation is not a threat to other. Observers in India have reasons to raise their eyebrows on the reappearance of the terminology 'partial border war' after some gap, more so in a contribution made by an academician close to Chinese hierarchy (the last such reference figured in an unofficial strategic affairs website in November 2008).

Also odd is the timing of such comments when India-China bilateral defence, political and economic ties are progressing steadily -- senior Chinese military officers including the Tibet commander have visited India recently, the Indian defence secretary is scheduled to visit Beijing for talks, both India and China have coordinated their actions in the conference at Copenhagen on climatic change, preparations are being made by both sides for the scheduled visit this year to China by the Indian President and lastly, India-China trade volume is slated to touch $60 billion by this year.

A basic question would therefore be what is the real meaning of the latest Chinese assessment of Indian defence strategy as above, which, judging from the affiliation of the analyst concerned, can definitely be considered as reflecting official views, especially that of the military. First comes the apparent dichotomy in the thinking of the civilian and military apparatus in China on relationship with India. However, when looked carefully, the reality looks different.

China has always been encouraging expression of strategic opinions and treating them as inputs for decision making at appropriate times. It has at the same time been taking care to see that the required diplomatic options, whether relating to India or other countries, are not prejudiced by such opinions. Specifically, this premise explains the rationale behind China's support to holding diplomatic initiatives, like talks between special representatives, to solve the boundary issue with India, while at the same time allowing hostile articulations on the subject by its strategists.

Beijing's such two-track mindset may also be seen as setting a context for understanding the opinion expressed by the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh during his recent visit to the US regarding China's 'assertiveness' vis-a-vis India of late.

Secondly, it is probable that the analysis clearly bringing out the 'India threat' theory, albeit after a gap, has something to do with the US factor. No doubt, it makes no mention of the US, but its appearance subsequent to the issuing of US-China Joint Declaration of November 17, 2009, may have its own meaning. Undeniably, reasons seem to have arisen for Beijing to feel that a qualitative change in its favour has occurred in the triangular China-US-India relations consequent to the opening of a new foreign policy course based on a 'smart power' concept (said to be a mix of hard and soft power) by the Barack Obama administration.

The US imperative towards China has undergone a shift to encompass a wider vision -- from one seeking China's emergence as a responsible stake holder in the international system to that aiming to establish a 'positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship' in the 21st century. In addition, the US has chosen to adopt a 'pragmatic' approach on human rights issue in China. If China thinks that it has as such come to occupy a superior position in the Sino-US equation at this juncture in the background of it having emerged as America's biggest creditor, the same may not be misplaced.

For Beijing, the same reason may hold good in believing that the US will be inclined to tone down its support to India on sensitive issues like the boundary problem and that the time is opportune to intensify its strategic pressure on India.

Its readiness to agree with Washington to 'cooperate' on India-Pakistan issues, which touched Indian sensitivities, may relate to such thinking. It may at the same time be not wrong to assume that some Chinese pronouncements (official journal Liaowang, December 1, 2009) considering China-US and China-India relations not as a zero sum game, are only for public consumption.

Lastly, China can be expected to factor the latest views of experts in formulation of its own defence strategy vis-a-vis India. The assessment that China, not Pakistan, is India's priority military target is not going to be missed by the defence policy planners in China. But China may not need to make fresh responses. It has already consolidated its troop strength in the border, established firm defence ties with Indian ocean littorals and stepped up military help to Pakistan; On the last mentioned, Beijing's recent justification of its military aid to Pakistan as a response to India's getting arms from the US and Russia, unveils what could be in store for future.

China's occasional talks on partial border war with India need close attention of New Delhi as they could be in conformity with the need expressed by China to 'win local wars under conditions of informatisation' (China's latest Defence White Paper). In a broader sense, trends in China towards enhancing its extended range force projection capabilities and establishing overseas naval bases, may have implications for the entire region, especially for countries like Japan, India and South China sea littorals, all having territorial problems with China.

One has only to take note of the US position that China's military modernisation is changing the balance of power in East Asia.

China is giving mixed signals, but it would be in India's interests to continue 'engaging' China. It should at the same time take all necessary steps to protect its strategic interests; India's revised defence strategy proves that it is prepared to do the same.

D S Rajan is director, Chennai Centre for China Studies.