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Pakistan Hated By All Its Friends

Pakistan remains “an army in search of a country,” according to French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s Diplomatic Adviser. The condescending characterisation, made to former US Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and US Ambassador to France, Charles Rivkin, is contained in a previously unpublished secret US diplomatic cable dated September 3, 2009 accessed through WikiLeaks.

The French adviser, Jean-David Levitte, described as “a National Security Adviser equivalent and Holbrooke’s former counterpart at the UN”, is considered by the US Embassy in Paris to be “one of the most important and influential voices within the GOF [Government of France] on national security policy.”

While most of the secret American diplomatic cables obviously focus on American perceptions of Pakistan, some of the documents also reveal telling bits of information about how representatives of other friendly states, particularly other allies of the US government and Pakistan, view this country.

In the meeting with Holbrooke and Rivkin, which took place on August 31, 2009, Levitte also asserted that “the Pakistani army is well regarded by the Pakistani people when not in power, but that it fails when in power.” He was also “more pessimistic” than the US about Pakistan, noting that the country has “chosen Islamicisation for generation after generation” leading to a now “transformed society.”

In another cable dated January 22, 2010, Jasmine Zernini, head of the French government’s interagency Afghanistan-Pakistan cell, told American officials that although General Kayani had “learned the lesson of Musharraf” and was staying behind the scenes, she felt he was (according to the cable) “manipulating the government and parliament, including to prevent change on Pakistan’s policy towards…FATA along the Afghan border, and also to stir up controversy regarding the Kerry-Lugar bill.”

In another cable (dated September 22, 2009) detailing meetings between officials from the American and British governments, Jon Day, the Director General for Security Policy in the Ministry of Defence, noted that “recent intelligence” indicated that Pakistan was “not going in a good direction.” He also asked visiting US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Ellen Tauscher, “if the US would be ‘obliged’ to cut relations with Pakistan if the military took over again.” Day also inquired about US perspective on Nawaz Sharif “whom he described as ‘potentially less venal’ than other Pakistani leaders.” Previously published cables have already revealed what opinion Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz held of President Zardari and Mr. Sharif.

In the same cable, Mariot Leslie, the Director General, Defence and Intelligence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the British government expresses satisfaction that China had “dumped” Pakistan in the Conference on Disarmament which in her opinion was a “good sign.”

The dismissive attitude towards Pakistan is, however, not limited to Western governments. In a cable dated December 21, 2009, Egyptian Defence Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi told US Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair that Egypt encountered the same suspicions from Pakistan as the US did. Pakistanis, he said, “don’t trust Egyptians either.” He went on to say that “while the Pakistanis were ‘difficult’… Egypt was still trying to ‘work with them.’” According to the cable, Mr Tantawi, who has previously served as the Egyptian Defence Attache to Pakistan, also pointedly noted that “any country where the military became engaged in ‘internal affairs’ was ‘doomed to have lots of problems.’”

The assessment by other friendly states of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan is also indicative of the perceptions — whether grounded in reality or not — that Pakistan must contend with. In a secret cable dated January 23, 2010, a senior Saudi intelligence official is quoted as telling a US official that “the SAG [Saudi Arabian government] viewed the Afghan Taliban as largely under the control of Pakistan” and that “the Afghan Taliban needed support to be able to become more independent of Pakistan.”

General Masudi, the head of internal affairs for the General Intelligence Presidency of Saudi Arabia told Barnett R. Rubin, the Special Adviser to Holbrooke that “outside powers, like Iran and Pakistan, had influenced the uneducated Afghans to believe that the US and the SAG were working against the Afghan people,” adding that “We have to convey the truth to this group.”

Gen Masudi also pointed out that the Saudi government was holding a number of Afghans in prison on charges of fundraising for the Taliban and speculated that “perhaps these prisoners could be used as bargaining chips in political talks.”

Gen Masudi while being sympathetic to Pakistan’s concerns regarding Afghanistan also cautioned that it was important to “reassure Pakistan that any activities conducted wouldn’t harm its interests, otherwise there might be a backlash.” He also explained Pakistan’s unease over developments in Afghanistan by saying that “the Pakistanis felt that they deserved to have a big part in Afghanistan,” according to the cable. “They wanted to be ‘the closest friend’ and were offended when they thought Iran or India were taking this role.”

The concern over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is, of course, a recurrent theme in many countries’ representatives conversations with US diplomats. According to the cable referenced earlier, for example, Mr Levitte, the French adviser to President Sarkozy, told the Americans that the French government was “not sure that the Pakistani nuclear deterrent is secure,” especially “with the frequent movement of nuclear weapons by the Pakistani military.” The French, he said, would provide technical assistance to Pakistan on issues of nuclear safety but “he firmly stated that the GOF would not supply nuclear energy technology.”

Osama Done In By Spy Ring Backed By Military Network

By SIOBHAN GORMAN And JULIAN E. BARNES

In January, the chief of the military's elite special-operations troops accepted an unusual invitation to visit Central Intelligence Agency headquarters. There, Adm. William McRaven was shown, for the first time, photos and maps indicating the whereabouts of the world's most wanted man.

Adm. McRaven—one of the first military officers to be brought into the CIA's latest hunt for Osama bin Laden—offered a blunt assessment: Taking bin Laden's compound would be reasonably straightforward. Dealing with Pakistan would be hard.

A Wall Street Journal reconstruction of the mission planning shows that this meeting helped define a profound new strategy in the U.S. war on terror, namely the use of secret, unilateral missions powered by a militarized spy operation. The strategy reflects newfound trust between two traditionally wary groups: America's spies, and its troops.

The bin Laden strike was the strategy's "proof of concept," says one U.S. official.
Last month's military strike deep inside Pakistan is already being used by U.S. officials as a negotiating tool—akin to, don't make us do that again—with countries including Pakistan thought to harbor other terrorists. Yemen and Somalia are also potential venues, officials said, if local-government cooperation were found to be lacking.

The new U.S. strategy has roots in a close relationship between CIA Director Leon Panetta and Adm. McRaven. In 2009, the two inked a secret agreement setting out rules for joint missions that provided a blueprint for dozens of operations in the Afghan war before the bin Laden raid.

The reshuffling of the Obama administration's national-security team will likely reinforce the relationship between the nation's spies and its top military teams. Mr. Panetta is expected to take over the Pentagon this summer armed with a strong understanding of its special-operations capabilities. Gen. David Petraeus, who is expected to become CIA director, made extensive use of special operations while running wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This account of the planning of the raid on bin Laden's home in Abbottabad, Pakistan, is based on interviews with more than a dozen administration, intelligence, military and congressional officials.

Officials and experts say the new U.S. approach will likely be used only sparingly. "This is the kind of thing that, in the past, people who watched movies thought was possible, but no one in the government thought was possible," one official said.

2004 CIA learns the nom de guerre of one of Osama bin Laden's trusted couriers.

2007 CIA learns the courier's real name.
2009 CIA and special-forces commanders ink a secret deal to conduct joint operations.
May 2009 CIA briefs President Obama on bin Laden.
Aug. 2010 Courier is tailed by the CIA to his home in Abbottabad, Pakistan.
Sept. 2010 Mr. Panetta briefs Mr. Obama on the Abbottabad compound.
Dec. 2010 CIA station chief's cover is blown in Pakistan; U.S. blames Pakistan's intelligence agency
Dec. 2010 Mr. Panetta updates Mr. Obama, who calls for attack planning to begin.
Jan. 2011 CIA briefs Adm. William McRaven, commander of military special-operations troops.
Jan. 27 CIA contractor Raymond Davis is charged in the shooting deaths of two Pakistanis.
Feb. 25 Select group of CIA and military officials meet to discuss intelligence and uncertainty regarding bin Laden's presence.
March 14 Obama decides on urgent unilateral action.
March 16 Mr. Davis is freed in Pakistan, easing the path to attack bin Laden's compound.
April 11 Mr. Panetta meets with Pakistani intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha.
April 19 Mr. Obama gives provisional go-ahead for helicopter raid.
April 28 National Security Council meets to present final plans for helicopter raid to the president.
April 29 Mr. Obama authorizes raid on the Abbottabad compound.
April 30 Mr. Obama calls Adm. McRaven for final status check.
May 2 An early-morning raid kills bin Laden deep in Pakistani territory.
May 2 Adm. Mullen calls Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Kayani to tell him of the raid.
May 7 Pakistan appears to out the CIA's station chief in Islamabad.
May 9 Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani gives a speech saying Pakistan didn't harbor bin Laden and criticizing the U.S. strike on its territory.
May 16 Sen. John Kerry travels to Pakistan to smooth tensions.

Pakistani Parliament Condemns U.S. Raid, Threatens Sanctions

This can only be termed as bizzare or a thief threating the police. Pakistan which is clearly in the docks due to its connivance with Osama and Al-Qaeda against the US war effort is trying to deflect attention by passing resolutions which have no meaning. What they have done today can be looked as a classic case of guilty conscious, instead of being happy that a monster has been put to rest they are trying to hit back at everybody that is questioning their dual faced policy when it comes to terror.

Pakistan's parliament threatened Saturday to cut off access to a facility used by NATO forces to ferry troops into Afghanistan, signaling a growing rift that began when U.S. commandos killed Osama bin Laden during a raid on a Pakistani compound.

A resolution adopted during a joint session of parliament condemned the U.S. action. It also called for a review of its working agreement with the U.S., demanded an independent investigation and ordered the immediate end of drone attacks along its border region.

Failure to end unilateral U.S. raids and drone attacks will force Pakistan to "to consider taking necessary steps, including withdrawal of (the) transit facility" used by the NATO's International Security Assistance Force, according to the resolution.

U.S. lawmakers have questioned how the world's most wanted terrorist managed to live in plain sight for years in Pakistan -- near the country's elite military academy -- without being detected.

Pakistani and U.S. intelligence officials have said there is no evidence that any active members of Pakistan's military or intelligence establishment knew about or actively protected the al Qaeda leader.

Publicly, leaders in both countries have downplayed a rift.
But the unanimous resolution made clear there was a growing dissatisfaction among Pakistani lawmakers.

The resolution also ordered a review of its counter-terrorism cooperation agreement with the United States.

The government is deeply "distress(ed) on the campaign to malign Pakistan, launched by certain quarters in other countries without appreciating Pakistan's determined efforts and immense sacrifices in combating terror," the resolution said.

It also said more than 30,000 Pakistani civilians and more than 5,000 military personnel had been killed in its fight against terror "and the blowback emanating from actions of the NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan."

Anger over U.S. drone strikes has mounted during the past year after it stepped up efforts along the Pakistani-Afghan border.

On Friday, a suspected U.S. drone strike killed four suspected Islamic militants in the Datta Khel region of North Waziristan, according to two Pakistani intelligence officials. They said an unmanned aircraft fired four missiles at a militant's vehicle on the border area.

The demands by the Pakistani civilian government come as new details emerge about the raid on bin Laden's Abbottabad compound.

Members of the U.S. Navy SEAL team that attacked the compound were wearing helmet-mounted digital cameras that recorded the mission, a U.S. military official told on Friday.

The official described the digital recording as hazy, fast-moving and subject to poor lighting in the rooms. The source also said it is hard to get clear images from the footage.

"This is not movie-quality stuff," the official said.

An official familiar with the material seized from the compound said Friday that Navy SEALs recovered a stash of pornography. The official would not discuss exactly where it was found, what it was or whether it is believed to belong to the al Qaeda leader or to someone else living at the site, such as bin Laden's couriers or his son.

Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to release the information.

Bin Laden's compound is also undergoing intense analysis, and U.S. officials say he apparently enjoyed a support network in Pakistan that allowed him to stay in one location for the past several years. He had no escape plan or means to destroy his reams and gigabytes of documents in the event of an enemy assault, according to the U.S. sources.

Two U.S. lawmakers joined a public chorus for the release of photos of bin Laden's body after seeing the images themselves.

"These are very graphic, gruesome pictures," said Rep. Doug Lamborn, a Republican from Colorado. But seeing them "gave me a sense of finality and closure."

A conservative legal watchdog group has filed the first lawsuit seeking the public release of the video and photographs of the raid and its aftermath.

Judicial Watch is asking the Department of Defense to comply with a Freedom of Information request for the material, especially photos of bin Laden's body. The legal complaint to force compliance was made in federal court in Washington on Friday.