Despite security council sanctions on Iran prohibiting development of Nuclear weapons and their delivery system yet both the ballistic missile program and the nuclear program keeps on growing.
The nuclear program has active support of Russia and the ballistic missile program is being supported by North Korea. It has been reported that Iran has already started enriching weapons grade uranium for its two missiles Shahab-1- and Shahab-2 with the help of Nort Korea. On top of that they have imported 19-20 BM-25 missiles from North Korea.
Beside North Korea it is the Syrians who are actively helping in this clandestine transfer of weapons. South Korea, Nigeria,Singapore,Italy have all confiscated sophisticated weapons and explosives hidden with normal goods either coming from Iran or going to Iran. In some case like in Nigeria some Iranian officials had to flee the country too.
Iran has floated quite a few bogus companies which work like fronts and try to buy dual use products from the west which can be later used for weponization. UN has asked its member countries to move against such firms and maintain strict end-user checks to help prevent this kind of fraud.
Showing posts with label Ballistic Missile. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ballistic Missile. Show all posts
Saturday, 4 June 2011
Sunday, 22 May 2011
Iranian Ballistic Missile Program
By Alexander Wilner, Anthony H. Cordesman
In a Feb. 2011 press conference, General Mohammed Ali Jafari, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), unveiled a new, locally developed missile. In reference to the missile, he stated that “as the enemy‟s threats will likely come from the sea, air,and by missiles, the Revolutionary Guard has been equipped with capabilities to neutralize the enemy‟s advanced technology.”.
They provide valuable insight regarding Iran‟s disposition toward the US military presence in the region, its responses to that presence, and ultimately how it intends to confront the US strategically. As a key element of Iran‟s strategic deterrent and doctrine of asymmetric warfare, Iran‟s advancements in ballistic missile technology cannot be ignored. Tehran views ballistic missiles as critical to its national defense. In addition to an effective means for delivering a nuclear warhead, Iran‟s military establishment firmly believes that an effective ballistic missile program provides the country with increased strategic and asymmetric capabilities. Since the early 1980s, Iran has been developing a burgeoning ballistic missile capability based on Russian, North Korean, and Chinese technology. Iran currently possesses the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East, and the country‟s military and scientific establishments are working to increase the sophistication, scale, and reach of its missiles. Tehran sees its missile capabilities as a key element to deter attack as well as a means to strike at high-value targets with little warning, such as Western and Western-backed forces in the region, including US bases in the Persian Gulf.
Of particular note are Iran‟s medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which include the Shahab-3 and its longer range variants. Based on the North Korean Nodong-1, the Shahab-3 has a range of 1,000 to1,500km, and can potentially reach targets throughout the Middle East.
Other Iranian MRBMs include variants of the Shahab-3, such as the Shahab-3A, Shahab-3B, Shahab-4 (Ghadr-1), Sejjil, and the BM-25. These missiles have ranges of 1,500 to 2,500km, and are thought to be able to strike at targets throughout the Middle East, Turkey, and southeast Europe.
They provide valuable insight regarding Iran‟s disposition toward the US military presence in the region, its responses to that presence, and ultimately how it intends to confront the US strategically. As a key element of Iran‟s strategic deterrent and doctrine of asymmetric warfare, Iran‟s advancements in ballistic missile technology cannot be ignored. Tehran views ballistic missiles as critical to its national defense. In addition to an effective means for delivering a nuclear warhead, Iran‟s military establishment firmly believes that an effective ballistic missile program provides the country with increased strategic and asymmetric capabilities. Since the early 1980s, Iran has been developing a burgeoning ballistic missile capability based on Russian, North Korean, and Chinese technology. Iran currently possesses the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East, and the country‟s military and scientific establishments are working to increase the sophistication, scale, and reach of its missiles. Tehran sees its missile capabilities as a key element to deter attack as well as a means to strike at high-value targets with little warning, such as Western and Western-backed forces in the region, including US bases in the Persian Gulf.
Of particular note are Iran‟s medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which include the Shahab-3 and its longer range variants. Based on the North Korean Nodong-1, the Shahab-3 has a range of 1,000 to1,500km, and can potentially reach targets throughout the Middle East.
Other Iranian MRBMs include variants of the Shahab-3, such as the Shahab-3A, Shahab-3B, Shahab-4 (Ghadr-1), Sejjil, and the BM-25. These missiles have ranges of 1,500 to 2,500km, and are thought to be able to strike at targets throughout the Middle East, Turkey, and southeast Europe.
Sunday, 15 May 2011
DRDO To Develop Interceptor Missile With 5,000 km Range
हिन्दी मे पड़ने के लिये
NEW DELHI: India has started working on a network of air-defence systems which would be able to shoot down any enemy missile even at a distance of 5,000 kms, before it can enter the Indian air space.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has already developed a missile that can intercept an incoming aerial threat 2,000 kms away under the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System and is now working on the second phase.
Under the second phase, missiles are being designed and developed in a manner that would enable them to shoot down any incoming missile at a distance of 5,000 kms, DRDO chief V K Saraswat said here.
The 5,000 kms interceptor missile is targeted to be ready by 2016, he said.
"It is well on schedule and we are already on initial design and testing stage," Saraswat said.
"Presently, our missiles are designed to engage targets within 2,000 km range. Later on, we will be making 5,000 km range class of interceptor missiles. That will be Phase-II of the BMD system," he added.
Last July, DRDO successfully tested the Phase-I of the indigenously developed interceptor missile from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Wheeler Island off Orissa coast.
On possibility of any tie-up with the US or any other country for development of the BMD systems, Saraswat said, "Our process of international collaboration is only to accelerate our own development process. Whenever we feel the need of a new technology, we may go for collaborations."
On the US offering India the Aegis Missile Defence Systems, he said, "These are market forces and will always remain there. There would always be market forces trying to sell the available equipment. In India this is not just a R&D effort but an actual programme, so I don't think we should worry about this."
India is also developing the Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) for the BMD systems. While the radars used for the Phase-I experiments were built with equal partnership from Israel, the Phase-II will have 80 per cent indigenous component.
"Only some of the equipments and consultancy would be provided by Israel," Saraswat said.
NEW DELHI: India has started working on a network of air-defence systems which would be able to shoot down any enemy missile even at a distance of 5,000 kms, before it can enter the Indian air space.
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has already developed a missile that can intercept an incoming aerial threat 2,000 kms away under the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System and is now working on the second phase.
Under the second phase, missiles are being designed and developed in a manner that would enable them to shoot down any incoming missile at a distance of 5,000 kms, DRDO chief V K Saraswat said here.
The 5,000 kms interceptor missile is targeted to be ready by 2016, he said.
"It is well on schedule and we are already on initial design and testing stage," Saraswat said.
"Presently, our missiles are designed to engage targets within 2,000 km range. Later on, we will be making 5,000 km range class of interceptor missiles. That will be Phase-II of the BMD system," he added.
Last July, DRDO successfully tested the Phase-I of the indigenously developed interceptor missile from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Wheeler Island off Orissa coast.
On possibility of any tie-up with the US or any other country for development of the BMD systems, Saraswat said, "Our process of international collaboration is only to accelerate our own development process. Whenever we feel the need of a new technology, we may go for collaborations."
On the US offering India the Aegis Missile Defence Systems, he said, "These are market forces and will always remain there. There would always be market forces trying to sell the available equipment. In India this is not just a R&D effort but an actual programme, so I don't think we should worry about this."
India is also developing the Long Range Tracking Radar (LRTR) for the BMD systems. While the radars used for the Phase-I experiments were built with equal partnership from Israel, the Phase-II will have 80 per cent indigenous component.
"Only some of the equipments and consultancy would be provided by Israel," Saraswat said.
भारत विकास कर रहा है 5,000 किमी रेंज वाला अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र
Read It In English
भारत ने हवाई रक्षा प्रणाली नेटवर्क पर काम शुरू कर दिया है , जो 5,000 किलोमीटर की दूरी पर किसी भी शत्रुमिसाइल को ध्वस्त करने में सक्षम होगा। अर्थात, इससे पहले कि वह भारतीय हवाई क्षेत्र में प्रवेश कर सके हमारे अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र दुश्मन के प्रक्षेपास्त्र को मार गिराएँगे ।
रक्षा अनुसंधान एवं विकास संगठन (डीआरडीओ) पहले से ही एक अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र विकसित कर चुका है, बैलिस्टिक मिसाइल रक्षा प्रणाली (बीएमडी) के तहत जो 2000 किलोमीटर मे किसे भी हवाईखतरे को मार सकता है । अब वह उसके दूसरे चरण पर कार्यरथ है।
दूसरे चरण के तहत, प्रक्षेपास्त्र को इस तरह विकसित किया जा रहा है कि वह 5,000 किलोमीटर की दूरी पर किसी भी आने वाले दुश्मन के प्रक्षेपास्त्र को मार गिराने मे सक्षम होगा ,यह बताया डीआरडीओ प्रमुख वी.के. सारस्वत ने।
5000 किलोमीटर वाली अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र को वर्ष 2016 तक तैयार करने का लक्ष्य , उन्होंने कहा।
"इस समय पर हम प्रारंभिक डिजाइन और परीक्षण कर रहे हैं " सारस्वत ने कहा।
भारत ने हवाई रक्षा प्रणाली नेटवर्क पर काम शुरू कर दिया है , जो 5,000 किलोमीटर की दूरी पर किसी भी शत्रुमिसाइल को ध्वस्त करने में सक्षम होगा। अर्थात, इससे पहले कि वह भारतीय हवाई क्षेत्र में प्रवेश कर सके हमारे अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र दुश्मन के प्रक्षेपास्त्र को मार गिराएँगे ।
रक्षा अनुसंधान एवं विकास संगठन (डीआरडीओ) पहले से ही एक अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र विकसित कर चुका है, बैलिस्टिक मिसाइल रक्षा प्रणाली (बीएमडी) के तहत जो 2000 किलोमीटर मे किसे भी हवाईखतरे को मार सकता है । अब वह उसके दूसरे चरण पर कार्यरथ है।
दूसरे चरण के तहत, प्रक्षेपास्त्र को इस तरह विकसित किया जा रहा है कि वह 5,000 किलोमीटर की दूरी पर किसी भी आने वाले दुश्मन के प्रक्षेपास्त्र को मार गिराने मे सक्षम होगा ,यह बताया डीआरडीओ प्रमुख वी.के. सारस्वत ने।
5000 किलोमीटर वाली अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र को वर्ष 2016 तक तैयार करने का लक्ष्य , उन्होंने कहा।
"इस समय पर हम प्रारंभिक डिजाइन और परीक्षण कर रहे हैं " सारस्वत ने कहा।
"वर्तमान में, हमारे मिसाइलों से 2,000 किमी सीमा के भीतर लक्ष्य संलग्न कर सकते हैं, बीएमडी प्रणाली के द्वितीय चरण मे अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र 5,000 कि.मी सीमा वर्ग तक लक्ष्य को निशाना बनायेगा "उन्होंने बताया ।
पिछले साल जुलाई मे, डीआरडीओ ने देश में ही विकसित इंटरसेप्टर मिसाइल(अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र) का सफलतापूर्वक परीक्षण इंटीग्रेटेड टेस्टरेंज (आईटीआर) व्हीलर द्वीप जो कि उड़ीसा तट पर है वहाँ किया था।
जब उनसे पूछा गया अमेरिका कि उस पेशकश के विषय मे जिसमे अमेरिका भारत को अपना एगिस मिसाइल रक्षा प्रणाली बेचना चाहता था, उन्होंने कहा, "ये बाजार की शक्तियों हैं और वह हमेशा बाजार मे उपलब्ध उपकरण बेचने की कोशिश करती रहेगी किन्तु भारत मे हम केवल अनुसंधान एवं विकास का प्रयास नहीं कर रहें है बल्कि यह आयुद्ध एक वास्तविकता है , इसलिए मुझे लगता है कि हमे इस बारे में चिंता नहीं करनी चाहिए. "
पिछले साल जुलाई मे, डीआरडीओ ने देश में ही विकसित इंटरसेप्टर मिसाइल(अवरोधक प्रक्षेपास्त्र) का सफलतापूर्वक परीक्षण इंटीग्रेटेड टेस्टरेंज (आईटीआर) व्हीलर द्वीप जो कि उड़ीसा तट पर है वहाँ किया था।
जब उनसे पूछा गया अमेरिका कि उस पेशकश के विषय मे जिसमे अमेरिका भारत को अपना एगिस मिसाइल रक्षा प्रणाली बेचना चाहता था, उन्होंने कहा, "ये बाजार की शक्तियों हैं और वह हमेशा बाजार मे उपलब्ध उपकरण बेचने की कोशिश करती रहेगी किन्तु भारत मे हम केवल अनुसंधान एवं विकास का प्रयास नहीं कर रहें है बल्कि यह आयुद्ध एक वास्तविकता है , इसलिए मुझे लगता है कि हमे इस बारे में चिंता नहीं करनी चाहिए. "
भारत बीएमडी प्रणाली के लिए है लांग रेंज ट्रैकिंग रडार (LRTR) का विकास कर रहा है । पहले चरण के प्रयोगों के लिए इस्तेमाल किया जाने वाला राडार इजरायल के साथ समान भागीदारी मे बनाया गया था, किन्तु दूसरे चरण का राडार 80 फीसदी स्वदेशी होगा जिसमे इस्राइल केवल नाम मात्र का भागीदार होगा ।
Wednesday, 20 April 2011
Piggybacking Anti-Satellite Technologies on Ballistic Missile Defense: India’s Hedge and Demonstrate Approach
Bharath Gopalaswamy, Gaurav Kampani
PROLIFERATION ANALYSIS, APRIL 19, 2011
In January 2007 China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile system. That test, although primarily meant as a warning shot across America’s bow, also helped concentrate New Delhi’s mind to begin fashioning policy responses to the militarization of space. The former head of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), Dr. Kasturirangan, typified India’s response when he noted: “obviously we start worrying…India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space…there is a need to look at means to securing these.” The scientific advisor to the Indian defense minister also warned that China’s test could possibly lead ISRO and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to collaborate in developing satellite kill technologies. The debate was subsequently joined in by the chief of India’s air force Air Chief Marshal Naik who made a forceful case for building anti-satellite weapons on the grounds that, “Our satellites are vulnerable to anti-satellite weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one.” These and other statements do not imply that India has an instituted anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) program. But they strongly suggest that Indian government agencies have begun exploratory efforts aimed at possibly instituting one.
During the past three decades, the stakeholders in India’s space program have been primarily civilian. Remote sensing, weather forecasting, telecommunications, and broadcasting consumed the bulk of ISRO’s attention. But starting in the last decade, the Indian military’s space footprint has begun to expand. Among India’s 23 active satellites, 10 fly in geostationary earth orbits (GEO) and 13 in low earth orbits (LEO). Among the latter, at least three satellites, the Cartosat 2A, the RISAT 2, and a technology experimental satellite, are speculated to have military applications. Both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy have plans to acquire dedicated satellites for communications and net-centric operations. Plans are also afoot to build a constellation of satellites for navigation purposes. The Indian military’s embrace of the information-hungry revolution in military affairs will thus heighten dependence and also its vulnerability to potential disruption of space-based assets. It is therefore no surprise that Air Chief Marshal Naik refers to ASAT weapons as “one of our challenges of future war capability.”
There are two ways in which one could defend against threats to space assets: non-destructive and destructive. In non-destructive methods, “jamming” and “spoofing” are used to interfere with a satellite’s systems. Electro-optical countermeasures such as “dazzling” optical sensors are also available. However, for such countermeasures to work, detailed knowledge of the targeted satellite is usually necessary. Among destructive methods are the Kinetic Energy-Anti-Satellite Weapon (KE-ASAT) and the co-orbital ASAT. Kinetic energy kill vehicles are lifted into space by rockets and destroy satellites by physically ramming into them. Co-orbital ASAT systems on the other hand are orbited into space like any other satellite, but are put through a series of maneuvers to collide with and destroy a designated satellite. Thus far, there are few indications that India is invested in non-destructive countermeasures. The evidence so far suggests that India is keeping its option on the KE-ASAT open. India has also indicated some interest in building a ground-based laser program although not much is known about the program in the public domain. Just recently, in March of 2011, DRDO tested a short-range ballistic missile interceptor, a radio frequency seeker, and a fiber-optic gyroscope, as parts of its ongoing anti-ballistic intercept program. These systems could also in theory serve as components of an operational KE-ASAT capability in the future.
The Indian approach to developing ASAT weapon technologies is measured and exploratory. It follows the now institutionalized methodology of developing dual-use technologies that have civilian and military spin-offs; or tacking military programs onto already instituted ones. The Indian approach also emphasizes the significance of ‘technology demonstration’ over the proving of operational military systems. Technology demonstration is less provocative externally, allows long lead times for technologies to mature, and is sensitive to the difficulties of building consensus within the Indian political system. This was the path for example that India took in developing nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile systems. To be sure, India has now elected in favor of operational nuclear and missile capabilities. However, for at least a decade, nuclear weapons were part of a hedge strategy. Similarly, chemical weapons were developed but never incorporated into the military’s operational planning. Based on statements from ISRO and DRDO representatives, it appears that any program to validate technologies for a KE-ASAT program would also fit into the genre of a hedge and demonstrate strategy.
The merits of a hedge and demonstrate strategy apart, there are pressures to test and validate key technologies for political reasons. Many Indian strategic analysts analogize from India’s harsh experience under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to urge the testing and validation of operational systems. They fear the possibility of an NPT-analogous space regime that might once again draw an artificial dividing line between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. Indian military leaders, perhaps wary of the DRDO’s past failures in making good on its promises to develop working systems as well as the operational demands of having capabilities on the ground, also favor operational validation over technology demonstration. The technologists and scientists from DRDO and ISRO however are less keen on a program of operational testing for two reasons. First, they believe that since many KE-ASAT technologies overlap with the ballistic missile defense system currently under development, especially in the areas of radar tracking and target acquisition, a separate test program would be of little practical value. But more significant, they are concerned that a full operational test would add to the problem of space debris, which now poses a serious threat to all space assets in the LEO. China’s ASAT test for example increased space debris (debris of diameter greater than 1 cm) in LEO by 15-20 percent, an experience that DRDO and ISRO are keen to avoid.
The ASAT debate once again attests to the status quo bias in Indian national security decision-making. It shows that Indian institutions respond to threats. But they do not necessarily anticipate them. Indian political leaders for example have still not publicly endorsed statements from ISRO, DRDO and the military. The Indian military’s wish list for an operational ASAT capability is also unlikely to be met for three reasons. First, it is not apparent that China poses an immediate operational threat to Indian space assets. Second, civilian agencies such as ISRO and DRDO have historically enjoyed far greater influence than the military in shaping strategic research and development choices. And finally, Indian political leaders are likely to find a hedge and demonstrate strategy less controversial and more economically viable. Thus an Indian ASAT program will more likely constitute a shadow capability in the short-term.
Dr. Bharath Gopalaswamy is a Senior Research Scholar at Cornell University’s Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Gaurav Kampani is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
PROLIFERATION ANALYSIS, APRIL 19, 2011
In January 2007 China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile system. That test, although primarily meant as a warning shot across America’s bow, also helped concentrate New Delhi’s mind to begin fashioning policy responses to the militarization of space. The former head of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), Dr. Kasturirangan, typified India’s response when he noted: “obviously we start worrying…India has spent a huge sum to develop its capabilities and place assets in space…there is a need to look at means to securing these.” The scientific advisor to the Indian defense minister also warned that China’s test could possibly lead ISRO and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to collaborate in developing satellite kill technologies. The debate was subsequently joined in by the chief of India’s air force Air Chief Marshal Naik who made a forceful case for building anti-satellite weapons on the grounds that, “Our satellites are vulnerable to anti-satellite weapon systems because our neighborhood possesses one.” These and other statements do not imply that India has an instituted anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) program. But they strongly suggest that Indian government agencies have begun exploratory efforts aimed at possibly instituting one.
During the past three decades, the stakeholders in India’s space program have been primarily civilian. Remote sensing, weather forecasting, telecommunications, and broadcasting consumed the bulk of ISRO’s attention. But starting in the last decade, the Indian military’s space footprint has begun to expand. Among India’s 23 active satellites, 10 fly in geostationary earth orbits (GEO) and 13 in low earth orbits (LEO). Among the latter, at least three satellites, the Cartosat 2A, the RISAT 2, and a technology experimental satellite, are speculated to have military applications. Both the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy have plans to acquire dedicated satellites for communications and net-centric operations. Plans are also afoot to build a constellation of satellites for navigation purposes. The Indian military’s embrace of the information-hungry revolution in military affairs will thus heighten dependence and also its vulnerability to potential disruption of space-based assets. It is therefore no surprise that Air Chief Marshal Naik refers to ASAT weapons as “one of our challenges of future war capability.”
There are two ways in which one could defend against threats to space assets: non-destructive and destructive. In non-destructive methods, “jamming” and “spoofing” are used to interfere with a satellite’s systems. Electro-optical countermeasures such as “dazzling” optical sensors are also available. However, for such countermeasures to work, detailed knowledge of the targeted satellite is usually necessary. Among destructive methods are the Kinetic Energy-Anti-Satellite Weapon (KE-ASAT) and the co-orbital ASAT. Kinetic energy kill vehicles are lifted into space by rockets and destroy satellites by physically ramming into them. Co-orbital ASAT systems on the other hand are orbited into space like any other satellite, but are put through a series of maneuvers to collide with and destroy a designated satellite. Thus far, there are few indications that India is invested in non-destructive countermeasures. The evidence so far suggests that India is keeping its option on the KE-ASAT open. India has also indicated some interest in building a ground-based laser program although not much is known about the program in the public domain. Just recently, in March of 2011, DRDO tested a short-range ballistic missile interceptor, a radio frequency seeker, and a fiber-optic gyroscope, as parts of its ongoing anti-ballistic intercept program. These systems could also in theory serve as components of an operational KE-ASAT capability in the future.
The Indian approach to developing ASAT weapon technologies is measured and exploratory. It follows the now institutionalized methodology of developing dual-use technologies that have civilian and military spin-offs; or tacking military programs onto already instituted ones. The Indian approach also emphasizes the significance of ‘technology demonstration’ over the proving of operational military systems. Technology demonstration is less provocative externally, allows long lead times for technologies to mature, and is sensitive to the difficulties of building consensus within the Indian political system. This was the path for example that India took in developing nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic missile systems. To be sure, India has now elected in favor of operational nuclear and missile capabilities. However, for at least a decade, nuclear weapons were part of a hedge strategy. Similarly, chemical weapons were developed but never incorporated into the military’s operational planning. Based on statements from ISRO and DRDO representatives, it appears that any program to validate technologies for a KE-ASAT program would also fit into the genre of a hedge and demonstrate strategy.
The merits of a hedge and demonstrate strategy apart, there are pressures to test and validate key technologies for political reasons. Many Indian strategic analysts analogize from India’s harsh experience under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to urge the testing and validation of operational systems. They fear the possibility of an NPT-analogous space regime that might once again draw an artificial dividing line between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. Indian military leaders, perhaps wary of the DRDO’s past failures in making good on its promises to develop working systems as well as the operational demands of having capabilities on the ground, also favor operational validation over technology demonstration. The technologists and scientists from DRDO and ISRO however are less keen on a program of operational testing for two reasons. First, they believe that since many KE-ASAT technologies overlap with the ballistic missile defense system currently under development, especially in the areas of radar tracking and target acquisition, a separate test program would be of little practical value. But more significant, they are concerned that a full operational test would add to the problem of space debris, which now poses a serious threat to all space assets in the LEO. China’s ASAT test for example increased space debris (debris of diameter greater than 1 cm) in LEO by 15-20 percent, an experience that DRDO and ISRO are keen to avoid.
The ASAT debate once again attests to the status quo bias in Indian national security decision-making. It shows that Indian institutions respond to threats. But they do not necessarily anticipate them. Indian political leaders for example have still not publicly endorsed statements from ISRO, DRDO and the military. The Indian military’s wish list for an operational ASAT capability is also unlikely to be met for three reasons. First, it is not apparent that China poses an immediate operational threat to Indian space assets. Second, civilian agencies such as ISRO and DRDO have historically enjoyed far greater influence than the military in shaping strategic research and development choices. And finally, Indian political leaders are likely to find a hedge and demonstrate strategy less controversial and more economically viable. Thus an Indian ASAT program will more likely constitute a shadow capability in the short-term.
Dr. Bharath Gopalaswamy is a Senior Research Scholar at Cornell University’s Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Gaurav Kampani is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.
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